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To explain female adolescent marriage patterns around the world, we develop a marriage market
model with asymmetric information about prospective marriage partners, and a noisy signal about the
brides quality during an engagement. In equilibrium, there is a negative relationship between the age and
perceived quality of women on the marriage market and, consistent with available evidence, older brides
make higher net marriage payments. The model also implies path dependence in the evolution of ado-
lescent marriage practices over time and persistent e¤ects on marriage practices from transitory shocks.
Model simulations show interventions which increase the opportunity cost of early marriage attenuates
the association between bride quality and age, triggering a virtuous cycle of marriage postponement.
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1 Introduction
The marriage of young female adolescents (henceforth called early marriage) remains prevalent in many
parts of the world despite repeated e¤orts by national governments and international development agencies
to discourage and end the practice. According to the State of World Population Report 2005, 48 per cent
of women in Southern Asia, and 42 per cent of women in Africa in the age group 15-24 years had married
before reaching the age of 18 (UNFPA 2005). Across all developing regions, one-third of women aged 20-24
were married or in a union before the age of 18 during the period 2000-2011 (UNFPA 2012). A growing
literature documents how the timing of marriage for women a¤ects investments in their own education and
fertility decisions (Field and Ambrus 2008), social networks and attitudes towards gender norms (Asadullah
and Wahhaj 2017), as well as the human capital of the next generation (Sekhri and Debnath 2014, Chari et
al. 2017).
In recent years, there has been renewed e¤orts from national governments and trans-national bodies to
address the issue. In July 2015, the United Nations Human Rights Council unanimously adopted a resolution
to "eliminate child, early and forced marriage" and the Sustainable Development Goals specically includes
the elimination of child marriage as one of its targets (5.3) within the broader goal of gender equality.1
International organisations, and NGOs have invested in developing interventions that raise awareness about
the negative consequences of early marriage, that provide parents incentives to postpone marriage for their
children, and that provide adolescents new opportunities to acquire skills and alternatives to a traditional
path of early marriage and early motherhood.2
Despite these recent e¤orts (and examples of success stories), the overall prevalence of marriage among
female adolescents around the world has yet to show a signicant downward trend. For example, using data
from 48 countries with at least two DHS/MICS surveys in the period 1986-2010, a UNFPA study nds little
overall change in the practice in either rural or urban areas (UNFPA 2012). Two other stylised facts about
female early marriage practices are noteworthy. Historically, the practice has been widely prevalent in China,
the Middle-East and the Indian sub-continent (Dixon 1971) while being absent from Europe from at least
the beginning of the 18th century, the period in which reliable records begin (Hajnal 1965). Second, the
practice nds its highest prevalence today in the least developed countries (UNICEF 2016).
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of female early marriage to address two related questions: (i)
What accounts for the variation in female adolescent marriage across population groups and the persistence
of the practice in developing countries today? (ii) What are the likely e¤ects of ongoing policy interventions
aimed at eradicating early marriage among young adolescents? The theoretical model has two key elements:
(a) asymmetric information regarding the quality of women on the marriage market; (b) an imprecise
technology for detecting the quality of prospective brides during an engagement. Marriages go ahead when
1http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/02/us-womensrights-un-resolution-idUSKCN0PC25O20150702
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/
2Notable examples include Bracs Adolescent Development Programme in Bangladesh, which provides livelihood training
courses, education to raise awareness on social and health issues, and clubs to foster socialisation and discussion among peers;
and the Berhane Hewan project in Amhara, Ethiopia, a joint initiative between the New York based Population Council and
the Amhara regional government, which uses community dialogue, and simple incentives involving school supplies to encourage
delayed marriage and longer stay in school for girls. The World Bank, the UK Department for International Development, and
the Nike Foundation are providing support to a number of similar projects around the world.
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a prospective bride is detected to be of high quality, or their quality remains undetected, but not when they
are detected to be of low quality. Consequently, the longer a woman has been on the marriage market,
the higher the conditional probability that she was previously found to be of low quality during an aborted
engagement.
Because of the negative (equilibrium) relationship between the age and perceived quality of women on
the marriage market, men prefer to marry young brides and women are inclined to accept marriage proposals
while they are young rather than wait. The higher the proportion of women who accept early marriage o¤ers,
the stronger is the negative relationship between age and perceived quality, which induces the next cohort
to make similar life choices. This leads to a persistence of early marriage practices. The model includes
marriage transfers (bride-price or dowry) determined at the time of marriage by Nash bargaining, where the
outside options of the prospective bride and groom serve as threat points. In equilibrium, older brides pay
higher net marriage transfers than young brides because of their weaker outside option and worse reputation,
which reinforces the inclination of women to marry at a young age.
Large-scale interventions of the kind discussed above provide adolescent girls with opportunities other
than marriage. By improving their outside options, these interventions may induce some fraction of adoles-
cent girls  who may otherwise have accepted o¤ers of early marriage  to pursue these opportunities. As
more girls postpone marriage for reasons unrelated to their quality on the marriage market, the negative
relation between the quality and age of prospective brides declines, causing more men to seek older brides,
and more girls to reject o¤ers of early marriage in the next period. Consequently, the reputation of older
women on the marriage market improves further and the cycle continues. Thus, expanding non-marriage
related opportunities for adolescents can trigger a virtuous cycle of marriage postponement. The fact that an
intervention targeted at adolescent girls can make it more and more attractive for future cohorts to postpone
marriage means that the long-term impact of such interventions on marriage and subsequent life choices may
well exceed the impact on the rst cohort which is exposed to it.
The theoretical model thus draws attention to the opportunities for adolescent girls outside of marriage
as a determinant of age of marriage. Poor access to education, training and employment for girls  often
characteristic of developing countries and regions  can severely limit these opportunities. But the model
also highlights that interventions aimed at addressing these constraints have dynamic e¤ects on the marriage
market, which needs to be taken into account in policy considerations.
We illustrate this argument and provide a measure of the relevant magnitudes using the case of Bangladesh,
which has one of the highest rates of female early marriage today. We solve for key parameters of the model
using a number of moment-matching conditions derived from the demographic situation in the country dur-
ing the 1970s (before the country experienced dramatic changes in fertility and the education and labour
force participation of women).
We show that an initiative that increased the opportunity cost of early marriage for women in Bangladesh
would trigger a continuous decline in its incidence as per the reasoning above. An increase by half a standard
deviation causes the incidence of early marriage to decline by a total of 11 percentage points. But the rst
cohort exposed to the initiative would experience only between one-third and two-third of this decline.
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Second, we show that a small-scale randomised control trial of the same initiative would fail to achieve the
marriage market equilibrium changes of the full-scale intervention and, therefore, signicantly under-estimate
its potential for lowering the incidence of early marriage.
Our modelling assumption that the quality of women on the marriage market is imperfectly detected
is motivated by the sociological theory that, in patriarchal societies, the honour and status of families are
dependent on the purity of their female members and that there is uncertainty regarding the purity of
unmarried adolescent girls (Ortner 1978, Kandiyoti 1988). The concern with purity extends to brides who
will marry into a family which, it has been argued, creates marriage pressures from the age of menarche
(Dube, 1997). There is growing empirical evidence within the economics literature of such pressures leading
to early marriage (Field and Ambrus 2008; Sekhri and Debnath 2014; Chari et al. 2017; Hicks and Hicks
2015; Sunder 2015; Asadullah and Wahhaj 2017) documented for Bangladesh, India, Uganda and Kenya.
The assumption that the quality of women on the marriage market is imperfectly detected provides a formal
explanation for this phenomenon but, as we show, it also has dynamic implications for the marriage market,
which have hitherto received little attention in the literature.
This paper belongs to a long literature that applies the concept of matching to investigate marriage-
patterns, following Gale and Shapley (1962) and Becker (1973, 1974). More specically, it is related to a
growing body of literature that applies models of dynamic search and matching (Diamond and Maskin, 1979)
for understanding phenomena related to marriage markets. For example, Anderson (2007) investigates the
relationship between population growth and dowry prices; Edlund (1999) argues that sex selection driven by
son preference can cause women to be born consistently in low-status families; Bhaskar (2011) shows how the
same phenomenon can lead to a congestion externality on the marriage market; Sautmann (2017) provides
a characterisation of the marriage payo¤ functions which would lead to commonly observed marriage age
patterns around the world including positive assortative matching in age; and Bhasker (2015) looks at the
implications of demographic transitions for the marriage market.
In the next section, we discuss how the model of female early marriage developed in this paper relate to
existing theories in the sociological, economic and demographic literature. The model of the marriage market
is introduced and analysed in Section 3. Section 4 extends the model to incorporate heterogeneous agents.
The model is used to conduct numerical analysis and derive implications for the case of early marriage in
Bangladesh in Section 5. Conclusions are provided in Section 7.
2 Alternative Theories on Marriage Age
Within the eld of economics, there is a rich literature explaining the phenomenon that in most societies,
husbands are typically older than their wives. For example, Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) argue that the
age gap in marriage is due, at least in part, to the fact that the individual characteristics which traditionally
determine ones desirability as a marriage partner are revealed or realised at a later age for men than
for women. Coles and Francesconi (2007) postulate that economic success (which increases with age) and
physical health (which declines with age) are complementary for the gains realised from a marriage. This
would lead to a pattern of age gap between marriage partners and  given that labour market opportunities
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have traditionally been more restricted for women  the tendency for older men to marry younger women.
A large literature also emphasizes the natural link between fertility preferences and a demand for young
brides. For example, in his study of marriage patterns across the world, Goody (1990) argues that, in
traditional societies, young brides are preferred because they have a longer period of fertility before them;
and they are more likely to be obedient and docile, necessary qualities to learn and accept the rules and
ways of her new household. Dixon (1971) attributed the historic practice of early marriage in China, India,
Japan and Arabia to the prevalence of clans and lineages which gave economic and social support to newly
married couples, as well as pressures to produce children for strengthening and sustaining the clan. By
contrast, the traditional emphasis on individual responsibility in Western family systems meant that newly
married couples were expected to be able to provide for themselves and their children, which necessarily
causes marital delays while the potential bride and groom acquire the needed skills, resources and maturity
to manage an independent household.
Beckers theory of fertility would further imply a link between income levels and the marriage age of
women. Becker hypothesized that parents care about both the quantity and quality of children which can
lead to a negative income elasticity of fertility as richer parents substitute away from quantity towards fewer
children of higher quality (Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis 1973).3 This would lower the demand for young
brides and, potentially, increase the demand for educated brides on the marriage market who can better look
after their o¤spring.4 Thus, the theory implies a decline in female early marriage and increase in female
schooling as income levels rise within the population.
Another explanation for female early marriage stems from notions of family honour and female purity.
According to Ortner (1978), across a wide range of societies the honour and status of families are held to be
dependent on the purity of their women; and their reputation for purity is ensured through strict control
over their social and sexual behaviour. Kandiyoti (1988) describes this honour system as a feature of societies
which are both patrilocal and patrilineal, encompassing social groups in North Africa, the Muslim Middle
East, and South and East Asia. And Moghadam (2004) notes that, in these societies, the honour of women
and, by extension, the honour of their family depends in great measure on their virginity and good conduct.
A large literature documents this phenomenon for specic societies, for example, Schneider (1971) for regions
on both sides of the Mediterranean sea, Dyson and Moore (1983) for northern India, Baron (2006) for Egypt.
In this context, the early marriage of women  at an age when they would have a higher expectation of being
pure  would help protect the honour of both the brides family and the family receiving the bride.
We argue that these theories are inadequate in explaining the phenomenon of female early marriage
on empirical grounds. First, if female early marriage is due to the economic drivers of the marriage age
gap, this explanation raises the question as to why the marriage age gap occurs in most societies while the
phenomenon of female early marriage is, and historically has been, specic to certain societies and regions;
absent, for example, from Western Europe, as far back as records can reveal, as noted in the introduction.
Sociological theories which emphasize the role of the extended family or clan and economic theories
3See also Doepke (2015) for a discussion on this literature.
4 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this last link.
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based on the quantity-quality trade-o¤ in fertility choice can explain variations in the practice of female
early marriage over time and across populations. But they would predict a close relationship between
fertility and marriage patterns, which is not consistent with recent data. For example, between the early
1970s and early 1990s, Bangladesh experienced one of the most rapid fertility transitions in recent history
(the total fertility rate declined from 6.3 to 3.4 children) but the median age of marriage increased by just
1.7 years over the same period.56 Figure 1, which shows a scatterplot of the total fertility rate (TFR) against
the median age of marriage for women aged 25-29 years based on every available DHS survey for countries in
South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, suggests only a weak correlation between the two variables.
On the other hand, there is wide variation in marriage age for any given TFR range, even in surveys where
the total fertility rate was close to the replacement rate of 2.
Figure 1: Country-Year Observations for Median Marriage Age and Total Fertility Rate
Sociological theories based on the concepts of family honour and female purity can account for regional
variation and the persistence of early marriage practices but they raise another question. The literature,
discussed above, implies that the concepts of family honour and female purity are important for the regions
represented in Figure 1. Yet, as the gure shows, there is substantial variation in female early marriage across
these populations.
The theoretical model in this paper explains female early marriage based on the assumption of asymmetric
information about the quality of potential brides. The exercise shows that it can lead to history dependence
5According to the 2014 Bangladesh DHS Report, the total fertility rate declined from 6.3 in the period 1971-1975 to 3.4 in
the period 1991-1993. The same survey reports the median age of rst marriage as 15.3 years among women aged 20-24 in the
1993-94 DHS, as compared to 13.6 years among women aged 40-44.
6The total fertility rate (TFR) refers to the total number of births a woman would have by the end of her childbearing
period if she were to pass through those years bearing children at currently observed age-specic fertility rates (NIPORT
2013). We use the TFR in this discussion as it captures fertility preferences at a point in time more accurately than completed
fertility rates by cohort.
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and dynamic changes to transitory shocks. Thus, the model can explain changes in early marriage practices
over time independently of changes in fertility, and the co-existence of di¤erent marriage practices across
societies which are otherwise identical. Our modelling approach is a formalisation of the role of female
purity on the marriage market in patriarchal societies but the dynamic e¤ects we highlight are absent from
the sociological literature.
The model has the prediction that a practice of early marriage prevails when adolescent girls have limited
economic opportunities and female purity is deemed important on the marriage market; but past shocks and
policies can also have persistent e¤ects on current marriage practices. We argue that this set of predictions
can account for historical and current patterns of early marriage better than the alternative explanations for
the phenomenon provided above.
3 A Model of Marriage Timing
3.1 Description of the Marriage Market
We describe a basic marriage market model in this section and discuss our choice of assumptions and
potential extensions in more detail in the next. The marriage market is set within a dynamic population
where individuals born in each period t live for a nite number of periods T . Each individual has two traits:
gender (male or female) and character (good or bad). In each cohort, there are equal numbers of males
and females and a fraction ε ∈ (0, 1) has bad character. An individuals own character is private information.
Individuals born in period t attain puberty at the beginning of period (t+ Tp). Females born in period t
can be in the marriage market in periods (t+ Tp) and (t+ Tp + 1). Males born in period t enter the marriage
market in period t+ Tp + 1 only. We describe individuals as being young and older at age Tp and Tp + 1
respectively. We denote by nm (t), nf1 (t) and nf2 (t) the number of men, young women and older women,
respectively, who are on the marriage market in period t. Married couples bear children when the husband
is aged Tp+2. Single men aged Tp+2 can potentially bear children too, out-of-wedlock (with single women
or women married to other men). Each newborn child has equal probability of being male or female. We
denote by κ the per-period growth rate in average fertility. In the model T , ε and κ are exogenously given.7
The marriage market is segmented into two parts. In the rst, men are matched with young women, and
in the second, men are matched with older women. At the start of each period, each man on the marriage
market decides which marriage market segment he will enter. We denote by θt the fraction of men who
opt for the marriage market segment for young women in period t, a variable which will be determined
endogenously.
The probability that a man seeking a young bride in period t (i.e. who opts for the marriage market











where  (.) : [0,∞) −→ [0, 1] is an increasing function.
When a match has been made successfully, a background check is performed to determine the character
7While a two-period overlapping generations model would su¢ce for our main theoretical results, the T period life-cycle
presented here provides more clarity regarding the demographic structure of the model and links more easily to the numerical
analysis in Section 5.
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of the prospective bride. The background check can have two possible outcomes. It may be uninformative
or it may reveal  in a private signal to the prospective groom and/or his family  that the prospective bride
has bad character. For a woman of good character, the background check is always uninformative. In the
case of a woman of bad character, her character is revealed with probability π ∈ (0, 1) and with probability
(1− π) it is uninformative.
Following the background check, the two parties decide whether the marriage should go ahead. If either
party declines, then the man and woman remain single during that period. We denote by um and uf the
per-period utilities obtained, respectively, by single men and women.
If they both decide to proceed with the marriage, they negotiate a marriage contract that species a
level of transfer τ from the bride to the groom (τ may be positive, negative or zero). The per-period
utility to the bride and the groom from marriage are given by u˜f (τ , cm) and u˜m (τ , cf ) respectively where
cm, cf ∈ {good,bad}. They bargain over the level of marital transfers τ . The outcome of bargaining
corresponds to the Nash Bargaining Solution with equal bargaining power for the two parties and the threat
point is given by their future prospects on the marriage market. During the bargaining process, the two
parties do not have knowledge of the character of the potential partners except for what has been revealed
by the background check. Upon marriage, the bride and the groom leave the marriage market with no
possibility of divorce or re-entry into the marriage market in a future period.
In summary, the sequence of events within each period t is as follows:
1. A new cohort is born, consisting of an equal number of males and females, a fraction ε of bad character,
and a fraction 1− ε of good character. Individuals born in period (t− T ) pass away.
2. All females born in period (t− Tp) (labelled young), and all unmarried males and females born in
period (t− Tp − 1) (labelled older) enter the marriage market. The men choose a marriage market
segment in which to search a bride.
3. Men in the marriage market segment for young and older brides are matched with potential brides
with the probabilities given above.
4. In case of a match, a background check is performed on the prospective bride and its outcome is
revealed to the prospective groom and/or his family.
5. The two parties decide whether the marriage should go ahead. If both parties are willing, they negotiate
a marriage transfer.
6. Unmatched individuals and matched individuals who decline the opportunity or fail to agree on mar-
riage terms remain single during that period. Pairs who marry learn about their partners true character
and obtain the marriage-specic utility.
7. Men born in period t− Tp − 2 bear children.
Future utility is discounted by a factor β ∈ (0, 1) per period. For ease of notation, we introduce the
functions us (τ , ε) = (1− ε) u˜s (τ , good) + εu˜s (τ , bad) for s = m, f . Thus, um (τ , ε) ( uf (τ , ε) ) is the
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expected per-period utility to a man (woman) from a marriage to a woman (man) who has a probability
ε of bad character when the marriage contract species a transfer of τ towards the groom. We make the
following assumptions about the functions u˜m (.), u˜f (.) and  (.).
Assumption 1 u˜m (τ , cf ) is strictly increasing in τ and u˜m (τ , good) > u˜m (τ , bad) for every τ .
Assumption 2 u˜f (τ , cm) is strictly decreasing in τ and u˜f (τ , good) > u˜f (τ , bad) for every τ .
Assumption 3 u˜s (τ , c−s) is additively separable in τ and c−s and weakly concave in τ for s ∈ {m, f}.






is increasing in θ for all x.
Assumption 6 um + uf > um (τ , 1) + uf (τ , ε) for all τ .
Assumption 7 um < um (τ , ε) and uf < uf (τ , ε) for some τ .
Assumption 6 implies that if the prospective bride is found to have bad character, then there is no level
of pre-marital transfers such that both parties would prefer marriage to singlehood. By contrast, Assumption
7 implies that if no new information is obtained regarding the prospective bride or groom, then there exists
a level of pre-marital transfers such that both parties would prefer marriage to singlehood (this is relaxed in
Section 4). Assumption 5 is a restriction imposed on the function  (.) which ensures that as the proportion
of men in a particular segment of the marriage market (either for young or older women) increases, so
does the number of men who are matched with that type of bride. We use Assumption 3 to ensure that
utility from marriage is increasing in the reputation (i.e. probability of good character) of the marriage
partner, even though marriage partners with better reputation are more expensive in terms of net marriage
transfers (see Lemma 4 in Appendix A).
3.2 Discussion on Modelling Choices and Assumptions
To provide support for the assumptions made about the marriage market and demographics above, we rely
on the ethnographic and demographic literature regarding marriage customs and practices. As there is
considerable variation in marriage customs and current practices in di¤erent parts of the world, we draw on
the literature for a particular region, South Asia, for the sake of consistency. In section 6, we discuss what
aspects of the model would need to be adapted for other regions and argue that the main insights from the
model regions do not depend on the specic restrictions we impose in the main analysis.
In reality, each period in the model would correspond to a time length of about 4.5 years and, for the
social contexts under study, we would choose Tp = 3. Thus, as per the assumptions above, females are
considered suitable for marriage from the age of 13.5 and males are considered suitable for marriage from
18.
We choose 13.5 years as an approximate the age of entry into the marriage market for girls as a majority
would reach puberty around this age which, as noted in the literature, serves as a constraint on the minimum
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age of marriage in a range of developing countries. On the other hand, 18 years is the approximate age at
which men would enter the marriage market as it marks the start of the period of active employment, which
furnishes them with the resources to support a family.8 Thus, being young corresponds to the period
between the onset of physical maturity for girls and active employment for men, roughly between the ages






By assumption, we have ruled out polygynous marriages and the possibility of divorce and remarriage.
These assumptions are reasonable approximations in the South Asian context where the incidence of sep-
aration and divorce remains very low (Dommaraju and Jones, 2011) and only a small fraction of men and
women are in polygamous marriages (Westo¤ 2003). Furthermore, most women and men are married by
their late twenties (Mensch, Singh and Casterline, 2005), which forms the basis of our assumption that they
remain on the marriage market  i.e. are considered eligible for marriage  during a limited number of years.
The assumption that the marriage market is segmented by age and that men pick a segment of the mar-
riage market is a formal representation of a matching process where matchmakers have traditionally played
an important role. In Arguing with the Crocodile, Sarah Whites detailed ethnographic account of marriage
practices in rural Bangladesh, she notes that it is customary for the grooms family to initiate contact with
the brides family, and that this contact is made through a matchmaker who provides a communication line,
and facilitates negotiations, between the two parties (White 1992). White also notes that "the di¤erent
parties manoeuvre and ght their own corners, aiming to achieve the best bargain they can" which gives
support to our assumption that bargaining is a key element of the negotiation process. Moreover "the many
interests involved in the making of a marriage undoubtedly color the evidence given. Mismatches occur not
only through lack of information, but also through deliberate deception", which suggests that each party has
limited information about the potential match, and that they may choose not to disclose information about
their daughter or son that may be regarded as a defect on the marriage market. Therefore, "... attention ...
is often focused primarily on the wealth of the household, and the amount of dowry which is demanded or
o¤ered" (White 1992).
Next we turn to the question what is meant by the character of potential brides and grooms. As noted
in Section 2, across a wide range of societies the honour and status of families are held to be dependent on
the purity of their women; and their reputation for purity depends on their propriety in social and sexual
behaviour. What behaviour is considered appropriate may vary across societies and over time. Examples
include abstinence from sexual relationships prior to marriage and extra-marital relationships following
marriage and, in the strictest cases, avoidance of excessive intimacy with unrelated males. In terms of the
8 In the context of Bangladesh, there is strong evidence that men rarely marry before the age of 18 unless they are engaged
in an income-generating activity. For example, we nd from the Bangladesh Adolescent Survey (2005) that, for those below
the age of 18, 27% of never-married boys and 100% of ever-married boys are engaged in an income-generating activity.
10
model, a woman of good character does not have the propensity to engage in such behaviour while a woman
of bad character does. This information is not readily available to the grooms party when they hail from a
di¤erent village or community which is typically the case in societies that practise some degree of marriage
exogamy. But they can make inquiries about a prospective bride through their social network that can
potentially reveal information about past behaviour that is indicative of bad character. The background
check described in the model is intended to capture this mechanism.
The ethnographic literature provides no indication that purity  in the sense described above  is a
relevant attribute for grooms in patriarchal societies. But men of good and bad character may di¤er in other
ways that a¤ect the brides utility from marriage, such as a propensity towards domestic violence. We have
implicitly assumed in the model that there is no mechanism to perform a background check on men, based on
the idea that their pre-marital behaviour provides no indication of how they will behave within a marriage.
Allowing a background check on men would have no implications for the reputation of older unmarried men
because young men, in any case, are not on the marriage market. Similarly, male character is not essential
to the model but it facilitates the numerical analysis in Section 5.
We have assumed that the utility derived from a match on the marriage market depends on the character
of the spouse but not on ones own character. A more general formulation would allow the utility function to
depend on both. But as character refers to di¤erent behavioural traits for men and women, there is no obvious
assumption to make between, for example, a grooms character and his relative preferences for a good versus
a bad bride. Even with some di¤erences in preferences of good and bad grooms, bad grooms would
adopt the same strategy as the good ones to avoid revealing their type on the marriage market; and likewise
for brides. Therefore, for ease of exposition, we have assumed homogeneity of preferences across di¤erent
types of character in Section 3.1.
The use of the Nash bargaining solution for marriage transfers requires some justication given that there
is asymmetric information between the two parties. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) show that,
under symmetric information, a bargaining game of alternating o¤ers yields the Nash bargaining solution as
the outcome when the time lapse between o¤ers is very small. In the context of traditional marriages, the
bargaining over marriage transfers is likely to be conducted, not by the bride and groom, but by members of
the extended family from whom any clear evidence of bad character is likely to be withheld for reputational
reasons. Thus, we argue that bargaining under symmetric information about character is a reasonable
approximation. Then Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) implies a Nash bargaining solution with a
threat point given by the expected value of the outside options of the bride and groom.9
While we assume that ε and π are the same for young and older women, it is straightforward to adapt the
model such that the probability of bad character or its probability of detection increases with age (higher ε
or higher π for older women). Such a formulation would capture the idea that as they grow older, adolescent
9For this result, we use Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinskys analysis of the bargaining game with a constant, exogenous
probability of breakdown. Even if bargainers have private information, we can argue that brides/grooms of bad character will
adopt the same strategy as one with good character in the bargaining game to avoid their types being revealed through their
behaviour. Then, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinskys result still applies, albeit with the threat point corresponding to the
outside options of individuals of good character. If the probability of bad character is small, this would make only a small
di¤erence in the equilibrium marriage transfers and do not change our qualitative results.
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girls have more contact and experiences that can a¤ect their character10 or they leave behind more evidence
regarding their character. These assumptions would make it easier to obtain an early marriage equilibrium
but the key insights of the model and, in particular, the reputational e¤ects of early marriage, would remain.
Note that, in the model, the fertility rate is assumed to be independent of the mothers age of marriage.
We make this assumption as birth control practices became widely prevalent in South Asia before these
populations experienced signicant shifts towards late marriage among women. Therefore, female marriage
age should not act as a constraint on fertility. While fertility preferences may be a¤ected by other factors
concurrently with changes in the marriage market, there is no mechanism within the model that can explain
these preference changes and, therefore, we take the fertility rate to be exogenous. For ease of exposition,
we assume in the theoretical model that the growth rate in fertility is constant and the sex ratio is equal to
1 but, for the numerical analysis, these parameters are based on the existing population data.
3.3 Equilibrium in the Marriage Market
For the subsequent analysis, we dene a marriage market equilibrium as follows.
Denition 1 A Marriage Market Equilibrium is a strategy prole for men and women born in each period
and beliefs regarding the character of young and older women in the marriage market such that (i) no
individual on the marriage market can improve their expected utility by deviating to an alternative strategy;
and beliefs satisfy (ii) Bayes rule for the given strategy prole for each positive probability event; and (iii)
the Consistency Criterion (Kreps and Wilson 1982) for each zero probabilty event.
In the following discussion, we use the terms marriage market equilibrium and equilibrium path inter-
changeably. A given strategy prole would generate a sequence {θt}
∞
t=0 where θt, as above, is the proportion
of men who seek young brides in period t (step 2 within each period of the game described in Section 3.1).
Given such a sequence, we can derive the beliefs regarding the character of older women on the marriage
market as follows:
Let λ1 (t) and λ2 (t) be, respectively, the period t probability of nding a match for young women and
older women on the marriage market. Let εf1 (t) and εf2 (t) be, respectively, the probability of bad character
among period t young and older women respectively before any background check has been performed; and
εˆf1 (t) and εˆf2 (t) the corresponding probabilities after an uninformative background check. By construction,














Reputation: As there is no information available on the character of young women when they rst enter
the marriage market, we must have εf1 = ε. For older women, the probability of bad character (before a
10However, in Section 5.1, we provide descriptive evidence, for women in Bangladesh, which suggests that the relevant
behaviour is driven by a xed character trait rather than one which is time-varying.
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background check has been performed) depends on the likelihood that they were matched with a man when
young. Specically, using Bayes rule, we obtain
εf2 (t+ 1) = Pr (bad|older)
=
Pr (older|bad) Pr (bad)
Pr (older)
=
[(1− λ1 (t)) + λ1 (t)π] ε
(1− λ1 (t)) + λ1 (t)πε
(3)




if there are some women who are getting married when young, the probability of bad character is higher
among older women than among young women.
Given that a background check detects bad character only with some probability π < 1, a woman
for whom such a check has been informative will still be assigned a positive probability of having a bad
character. We can determine this probability for young and older women using Bayes rule as follows:
εˆf1 = Pr (bad|young+uninformative)
=








(1− π) (1− εf1) + (1− π) εf1
< εf1
εˆf2 = Pr (bad|older+uninformative)
=








(1− π) (1− εf2) + (1− π) εf2
< εf2
So, when a background check on a woman has been uninformative, the probability that she has bad
character declines but remains positive, in case of both young women and older women. In summary, we
have established the following results.
Summary 1 εf1 = εf and εf2 > εf ;
εf2 > εf1 and εˆf2 > εˆf1;
εˆf1 < εf1 and εˆf2 < εf2 if the background check has been uninformative;
εˆf1 = εˆf2 = 1 if the background check has revealed bad character.
Next, let us consider whether a matched man and woman would be willing to proceed with a marriage
after a background check has been performed (step 5 within each period of the game described in Section
3.1). This decision depends on their outside options, which we can derive as follows.
13
Composition of Marriage Market Segments: Given a sequence {θt}
∞
t=0, we can also determine the
number of men and women in each marriage market segment in each period t (which, in turn, determine
the match probabilities). In period t, by assumption, all females born in period t − Tp enter the marriage
market segment for young brides. Similarly, in period t, all males born in period t−Tp−1 enter the marriage
market. Thus, nf1 (t) and nm (t) depend simply on the initial population and the fertility growth rate κ. To
x ideas, let us denote by y the size of the male cohort on the marriage market in period 0; i.e. nm (0) = y.
Given a fertility growth rate of κ, the size of the young female cohort on the marriage market is given by
nf1 (0) = κy. The number of older women on the marriage market in period t depends on the number of
young women who failed to marry in period t− 1. In particular, we have
nf2 (t+ 1) = [1− λ1 (t) + λ1 (t) επ]nf1 (t) for t = 0, 1, 2, .. (6)
The logic behind (6) is as follows: if a fraction λ1 (t) of young women are matched with men in period t, then
a fraction λ1 (t) επ will be discovered to have bad character. Therefore, those who remain on the marriage
market in the next period would include those who were not matched, numbering (1− λ1 (t))nf1 (t) and
those who were found to have bad character, numbering λ1 (t) επy.
Outside Options: Let us denote by vf2 the outside option of older women on the marriage market. An
older woman who does not marry in the current period will remain single hereafter. Therefore, her outside
option is given by
vf2 = ζuf
where ζ = 1−β
(T−Tp)
1−β . A young woman who does not marry in the current period will re-enter the marriage
market as an older woman. If her probability of marrying as an older bride equals λˆ2, then her outside





= uf + βζ
n












uf + βζλˆ2uf (τ2, εm) (7)
For young women of good character, λˆ2 = λ2 (i.e. her probability of nding a match on the marriage market
when she is older) but for young women of bad character, we have λˆ2 = λ2 (1− π) because they face a risk of
having their bad character revealed if they remain in the marriage market till they are older, make another
match, and undergo another background check.
Let us denote by vm the outside option of older men on the marriage market (since young men do not
marry by assumption, we need not consider their outside options for the analysis). An older man who does
not marry in the current period will remain single hereafter. Therefore, his outside option is given by
vm = ζum
By Assumption 6, if the background check reveals bad character, there is no marriage contract such that
both parties will prefer marriage with the currently matched partner to remaining single the rest of their
lives. Therefore, they would not be willing to proceed with the marriage negotiations. By Assumption 7,
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if the background check has been uninformative, both parties will anticipate that a negotiated marriage
contract in the current period (based on the Nash Bargaining Solution) will generate a higher expected
continuation utility than refusing the current marriage prospect. Therefore, they will choose to proceed with
the marriage negotiations.
Marriage Transfers: Next, we consider the terms of the negotiated marriage contract. The marriage
transfers are given by the Nash Bargaining Solution which, in turn, depends on the outside options of the
potential bride and groom. Note that all men on the marriage market have identical outside options and all
older women on the marriage market have identical outside options. Therefore, all marriages involving older
women will have identical transfers which we denote by τ2. Using the Nash Bargaining Solution, we obtain
τ2 = argmax
τ
{ζum (τ , εˆf2)− vm} {ζuf (τ , ε)− vf2} (8)
In the case of young women, the outside option depends on their quality as discussed above. But their
true quality is not known to the grooms party during the bargaining process beyond what is revealed through
the background check. As discussed in the preceding section, brides of good and bad character have the
same outcome from the bargaining process and the bargaining solution depends on the expected value of the




. Then, all young women will have identical transfers which we
denote by τ1. Using the Nash Bargaining Solution, we obtain
τ1 = argmax
τ
{ζum (τ , εˆf1)− vm}
n





Choice of Marriage Market Segment: Given the expressions for the outside options and marriage
transfers derived above, we can analyse the choice of marriage market segment (step 2 within each period of
the game) for men on the marriage market.






, and the potential bride is found to have bad character with probability πεf1. Therefore, the man





(1− πεf1). From this outcome, he receives a continuation
utility of ζum (τ1, εˆf1). Therefore, the expected utility from choosing the marriage market segment for young






















(1− πεf2). From this outcome, he receives a continuation utility of ζum (τ2, εˆf2). There-
















From equation (10), we can see that the expected utility to men from the choice of marriage market
segment for young brides, U1, depends on θt. The outside option of young brides, and therefore the equilib-
rium marriage payments, depend on the marriage prospects of older women in the next period. Thus, the
value of U1 in period t also depends on θt+1. All other terms on the right-hand side of (10) are exogenously
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given. Therefore, we can write the expected utility from stating a preference for a young bride as a function
U1 (θt, θt+1).
Similarly, from equation (11), we see that the expected utility to men on the marriage market in period t
from the choice of marriage market segment for older brides, U2, also depends on θt. The reputation of older
brides, and therefore the utility from marrying older brides depends on the proportion of young women who
were married in the previous period. Thus, the value of U2 in period t also depends on θt−1. All other terms
on the right-hand side of (11) are exogenously determined. Therefore, we can write the expected utility from
seeking an older bride as a function U2 (θt, θt−1).
It is straightforward to establish the following results.
Lemma 1 (i) Under Assumption 4, U1 (θt, θt+1) is strictly decreasing in θt and U2 (θt, θt−1) is strictly
increasing in θt.
(ii) Under Assumptions 1, U1 (θt, θt+1) is strictly increasing in θt+1.
(iii) Under Assumption 3, U2 (θt, θt−1) is strictly decreasing in θt−1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The rst part of Lemma 1 follows directly from the properties of the functions um (., .) and  (.). The
second part of Lemma 1 has the following intuition: as the future marriage prospects of young women
improve, they will require higher net marriage payments for marrying as young brides. Therefore, the
expected utility to men from seeking young brides will decline. The third part of Lemma 1 has the following
intuition: if a large fraction of men sought young brides in the preceding period, then the reputation of older
women, and therefore the expected utility from seeking an older bride, is low in the current period.
If, in equilibrium, θt ∈ (0, 1), then we must have U1 (θt, θt+1) = U2 (θt, θt−1). If not, some men would be
able to improve their expected utility by searching in a di¤erent segment of the marriage market.11 From
Lemma 1(i), we see that U1 (.) is monotonically decreasing, and U2 (.) is monotonically increasing, in θt.
Therefore there is, at most, one value of θt ∈ [0, 1] which satises the preceding equation, as in Figure 2.
11 In equilibrium, men of good and bad character will, on average, pursue the same strategy; i.e. a fraction θ of each type seek
young brides, or each type plays a mixed strategy, opting for the marriage market segment for young brides with probability
θ. If not, then potential grooms would be able to improve their perceived character simply by moving from one segment of the
marriage market to another.
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Figure 2: Expected Utility to Men from Seeking Di¤erent Types of Brides
Similarly, we can reason that if θt = 0, we must have U1 (0, θt+1) ≤ U2 (0, θt−1) and if θt = 1, then
U1 (1, θt+1) ≥ U2 (1, θt−1). These arguments enable us to compute the equilibrium value of θt whenever θt−1
and θt+1 are known. For this purpose, let us dene function I : [0, 1]× [0, 1] −→ [0, 1] as follows:
Denition 2
I (θt−1, θt+1) =


θ if U1 (θ, θt+1) = U2 (θ, θt−1) for some θ ∈ [0, 1]
0 if U1 (θ, θt+1) < U2 (θ, θt−1) for each θ ∈ [0, 1]
1 if U1 (θ, θt+1) > U2 (θ, θt−1) for each θ ∈ [0, 1]
In words, the function I (θt−1, θt+1) returns the fraction of men on the marriage market who seek young
brides in period t in equilibrium, if the corresponding proportions in periods t − 1 and t + 1 are given by
θt−1 and θt+1 respectively. Using this denition, we can establish the following result.
Proposition 1 Given an initial value θ0, the sequence {θτ}
∞
τ=1 together with beliefs given by (3), (4) and
(5) constitutes an equilibrium if and only if θt = I (θt−1, θt+1) for t = 1, 2, ...
Proposition 1 provides a convenient characterisation of all possible equilibria in the marriage market
and the di¤erent ways in which the marriage age for women may evolve over time when all individuals in
the marriage market are choosing their best response. The proposition takes the initial value of θ as given
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because, by construction, the reputation and number of older women on the marriage market depends on
the marriage decisions of men in the preceding period. Alternatively, we can take the initial reputation and
number of older women on the marriage market as given but the two approaches are isomorphic.
The sequence {θτ}
∞
τ=1 described in Proposition 1, together with the initial value θ0, is su¢cient to
provide a complete description of the marriage market from period 1 onwards including the number of
men and women in each segment of the marriage market (using an initial cohort size y as described above,
the fertility growth rate parameter κ and equation (6)) and their respective match probabilities (using (1)
and (2)), beliefs regarding the character of older women on the marriage market (given by (3) and (5)),
the outside option of young women on the marriage market (equation (7)), and the equilibrium marriage
transfers (equations (9) and (8)).
However, an assumption about the initial value of θ is not su¢cient to generate a unique equilibrium path.
For the same initial value θ0, there are potentially multiple sequences {θτ}
∞
τ=1 satisfying the condition in
Proposition 1, i.e. multiple equilibrium paths. For example, a marriage market where there is an expectation
of wide prevalence of early marriage in the future would have a di¤erent trajectory from another marriage
market where there is an expectation of a wide prevalence of late marriage even if they start from the same
initial conditions. For this reason, in the subsequent analysis, we focus on a particular kind of equilibrium
which, we argue, has an intuitive appeal. This is the marriage market equilibrium path with "iterated
expectations" presented in Section 3.4.
Before introducing this equilibrium renement, we introduce the concept of a steady-state in the marriage
market which is important for the subsequent analysis. We say that the marriage market is in steady-state
if the proportion of men seeking young brides is the same in every period. If some θ ∈ [0, 1] satises the
equation θ = I (θ, θ), then there exists an equilibrium where the proportion of men seeking young brides
is equal to θ in every period. We can establish that for any set of preferences, matching function, outside
options, and parameters ε and π, there is at least one steady-state:
Lemma 2 There exists at least one steady-state value θ ∈ [0, 1]; i.e. I (θ, θ) = θ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 3 shows a possible plot of I (θ, θ) against θ. It follows from Lemma 1(i) that the curve is upward-
sloping. At θ = 0, it must lie on or above the 45-degree line and at θ = 1, it must lie on or below the
45-degree line. From Lemma 2, we know that it must cross the 45-degree line at least once. Each value of θ
where the curve crosses the 45-degree line constitutes a steady-state equilibrium. Thus, the marriage market
has at least one and potentially, multiple, steady-state equilibria.
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3.4 Marriage Market Equilibria with Iterated Expectations
We noted above that an assumption about the initial value of θ is not su¢cient to generate a unique
equilibrium path in the marriage market with forward-looking beliefs. Therefore, in this section, we introduce
an equilibrium renement as follows. First, we compute, given an initial value of θ, the evolution of the
marriage market if people had naive expectations; more precisely if, when making decisions in period t,
they expect that the proportion of men seeking young brides in the next period will be the same as it
was in the last: θt+1 = θt−1. Next, we derive a second marriage market path where expectations about
the future corresponded to the marriage market path obtained with naive expectations; i.e. Et (θt+1) =
I (θt, I (θt, θt)). We iterate this process, in each step assuming that expectations about θ in future periods
correspond to the θ values in the sequence derived in the preceding step.. We can show that the sequence of
marriage market paths generated using this algorithm corresponds to a unique forward-looking equilibrium
path. This is formally shown below. First, we introduce a formal denition for, and establish some key
properties of, the Naive Expectations equilibrium.
Denition 3 Given an initial value θ0, the sequence {θτ}
∞
τ=1 constitutes a Naive Expectations Equilibrium
if, θt = I (θt−1, θt−1) for t = 1, 2, ...
Proposition 2 Given an initial value θ0, there is a unique sequence {θτ}
∞
τ=1 that satises the criteria of a
Naive Expectations equilibrium. Furthermore,
(i) if I (θ0, θ0) > θ0, then {θτ}
∞
τ=1 is an increasing sequence which converges to the smallest steady-state
in the interval (θ0, 1];
(ii) if I (θ0, θ0) < θ0, then {θτ}
∞
τ=1 is a decreasing sequence which converges to the largest steady-state
in the interval [0, θ0);
(iii) if θ0 = I (θ0, θ0), then θτ = θ0 for τ = 1, 2, ....
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Next, we show that the sequence of marriage market paths generated using the algorithm described above
converges to a unique marriage market equilibrium path with forward-looking expectations.


















for α ∈ {1, 2, ..}, τ ∈ {2, 3, ..}. Let




τ=1. The sequence Θ exists, is unique, and, together with initial value θ0, constitutes a
marriage market equilibrium path. Furthermore, Θ is a monotonic sequence that converges to a steady-state.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We call the marriage market path generated by the iterative process described in Proposition 3 an equi-
librium with iterated expectations. The proposition establishes existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Also, the path is monotonic and it converges to a steady-state value. While it is only one of potentially
many marriage market equilibria, we argue that it has an intuitive appeal because, if we iteratively make
the individuals on the marriage market more sophisticated in forming their future beliefs, the corresponding
sequences will converge to the marriage market equilibrium described in Proposition 3. For the subsequent
analysis, this is our preferred equilibrium.
3.5 Path Dependence and Diverse Marriage Customs
As stated in Proposition 3, for a given initial value θ0, there is a unique equilibrium with iterated expecta-
tions. Nevertheless, it suggests an explanation as to why di¤erent populations with the same characteristics
 i.e. same preferences, outside options, matching process, and parameters ε and π  may have di¤erent rates
of prevalence in early marriage at a point in time. The incidence of early marriage in two populations at
some point in the past may have been di¤erent because of policies or shocks, even if these were transitory. In
the model, we would represent such a scenario using di¤erent initial values θ0 for the two populations. Each
value of θ0 generates a unique marriage market path (Proposition 3), and we can further show that distinct
values of θ0 generate distinct paths in the marriage market (see Corollary to Proposition 3 in Appendix A).
Thus, the prevalence of early marriage can di¤er across populations because of historical di¤erences in
policies or shocks even if these populations are otherwise identical. In other words, there is path dependence
in the marriage market. Furthermore, if the marriage market has multiple steady-state equilibria (as in
Figure 3), then two populations that are otherwise identical may have very di¤erent marriage customs in
permanence; for example (i) a steady-state equilibrium where most men seek young brides and most women
marry early, older women on the marriage market have substantially worse reputations, and young women
have a weak outside option (because they would have a low probability of marrying at an older age if they
turn down a current marriage o¤er); (ii) a steady-state equilibrium where most men seek older brides and
most women marry late, older women on the marriage market have reputations similar to that of young
women, and young women have a strong outside option (because they would have a high probability of
marrying at an older age if they turn down a current marriage o¤er).
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3.6 Additional Properties of the Marriage Market Equilibrium
Relationship between the Brides Age and Net Marriage Transfers: Although the model can
generate dynamics in the marriage market as well as a multiplicity of equilibria, older brides always make
higher net marriage transfers than young brides with one exception. Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 In any marriage market equilibrium, in each period t, older brides make higher net marriage
transfers than young brides, i.e. τ1 (t) < τ2 (t) if θt−1 > 0 or θt+1 < 1; τ1 (t) = τ2 (t) if θt−1 = 0 and
θt+1 = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. If a positive fraction of men sought young brides in
period t − 1, then older women on the marriage market will have worse reputation than young women in
period t. If a positive fraction of men are expected to seek older brides in period t+ 1, then young women
have a better outside option than older women in period t. Both these e¤ects will drive up the price of
young brides relative to that of older brides. Conversely, older women on the marriage market have the same
reputation and outside option as young women in period t if all men sought older brides in period t− 1 and
all men are expected to seek young brides in period t + 1, leading to the exception case indicated in the
proposition. But this is unlikely to occur in any marriage market equilibrium. Proposition 4 is consistent
with the stylised fact that, for women, delaying marriage requires a higher dowry payment (Field and Ambrus
2008; Amin and Bhajracharya 2011).
Negative Externalities from Early Marriage: We can use the steady-state equilibrium to illustrate
the ine¢ciency that is inherent in the marriage market. Consider a woman who accepts an o¤er of marriage
when young. By doing so, she adversely a¤ects the reputation of  and therefore the net marriage transfer
required from  those who marry late (either because they declined o¤ers of early marriage, or because they
were not matched while young). Thus, accepting an o¤er of early marriage imposes a negative externality
on women who marry later, which is not internalised in the marriage market equilibrium.
A hypothetical way of internalising this cost would be to impose a fee for accepting o¤ers of early
marriage equal to the resulting increase in net marriage payments required from older brides (the collected
fees subsequently being used to subsidise the cost of marrying late). It is evident that such a policy would
discourage young women from accepting o¤ers of early marriage and cause those at the margin to decline
such o¤ers. In order words, a policy which leads to an internalisation of the negative externality would tend
to lower the proportion of early marriages.
The Role of Reputational E¤ects in Early Marriage: The key feature of the model that creates
a pressure for early marriage is the reputational e¤ects associated with older women on the marriage mar-
ket. The probability with which a background check can detect bad character among potential brides, π,
determines the importance of these reputational e¤ects.
Intuitively, we can reason that a change in π would have the following e¤ects. Decreasing π improves the
reputation of older women on the marriage market in period t for any given θt−1 and xt−1. Furthermore, it
improves the outside option of young women in period t for any given θt+1 and xt, as it improves their next
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period reputation were they to re-enter the marriage market. Therefore, they are more inclined to decline
o¤ers of early marriage and they can bargain for more favourable marriage transfers. From the perspective
of potential grooms, this lowers the expected utility of seeking young brides and raises the expected utility
of seeking older brides in period t for any given θt−1, xt−1 and θt+1. These changes creates a shift towards
later marriage in equilibrium. Proposition 5 provides a formalisation of this reasoning by comparing the set
of steady-state equilibria for di¤erent values of π.
Proposition 5 Suppose π1, π2 ∈ [0, 1) and π1 < π2. For every steady-state in the marriage market under
π = π2 where the proportion of men seeking young brides is above 0, there exists a steady-state under π = π1
where a smaller proportion of men seek young brides. For every steady-state in the marriage market under
π = π1 where the proportion of men seeking young brides is below 1, there exists a steady-state under π = π2
where a higher proportion of men seek young brides.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If π = 0, then age does not provide any signal about the quality of potential brides in the marriage
market, and there are no reputational e¤ects from delaying marriage. Then, according to Proposition 5,
we obtain a steady-state equilibrium with a lower incidence of early marriage than for any π ∈ (0, 1). This
illustrates the role of the reputational e¤ects discussed earlier in sustaining the practice of early marriage.
In the Section 5, we conduct a moment-matching exercise for the marriage market in Bangladesh to obtain
values for key parameters of the model including π and can thus assess the importance of these reputational
e¤ects.
4 Turning Down Marriage O¤ers and Agent Heterogeneity
The possibility of path dependence and multiple steady-states highlighted above raises the question whether
and how the marriage market can be moved from a situation where there is a wide prevalence of early
marriage to one where it is rare (or the transition process is accelerated). The type of policies discussed in
the introduction can a¤ect the marriage market by expanding the opportunities for adolescent girls outside
of marriage (e.g. in education or employment). In particular, these policies may induce adolescent girls with
marriage o¤ers to turn them down to pursue these opportunities which, as we will show, has dynamic e¤ects
on the marriage market.
To explore the e¤ects of such policies within the model, in this section we relax Assumption 7, which
would mean that for some matches on the marriage market, there may be no possible contract that satises
both parties. To capture situations where some, but not all, young women may nd it in their interest to turn
down marriage o¤ers, we allow utility from remaining single while young to vary across individuals. This
may be due to di¤erences in opportunities or prospects. Specically, let uf1 = x+ ψ where x is a constant
common to all individuals and ψ is distributed across individuals according to the cumulative distribution
function F (.).12 We assume that ψ is observed by the grooms party when a match is made. Then, we can
12 In a similar fashion, we could extend the model to introduce heterogeneity in the wealth or preferences of men. This can
lead to men with di¤erent characteristics opting for di¤erent types of brides but not impact upon the main dynamics related
to early marriage. Therefore, for ease of exposition, we abstract away from groom heterogeneity in this paper.
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establish the following result.
Lemma 3 Suppose that a young woman with utility from singlehood equal to uf1 is matched with a potential
groom. Then, there exists a threshold value x such that a marriage contract acceptable to both parties is
negotiated if and only if uf1 ≥ x. The same threshold applies whether the young woman has good or bad
character.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If there are some young women above the threshold x (i.e. F (x− x) < 1), this has two implications for
the marriage market. First, a potential groom is less likely to be matched with a young bride with whom a
marriage contract can be negotiated. The probability of marriage for men in the marriage market segment






(1− πεf1)F (x− x)
where θ, as before, is the proportion of men who seek young brides. Second, if some women are postponing
marriage when they are young, it provides an alternative reason why older women may be single (other
than the two reasons discussed above: not being matched with a potential groom and being found to have
bad character); and, consequently, the reputation of older women on the marriage market would improve.
Specically, it is given as follows:
εf2 = Pr (bad|older)
=
Pr (older|bad) Pr (bad)
Pr (older)
=⇒ εf2 =
εf [(1− λ1) + λ1π + ηλ1 (1− π)]
(1− εf ) [(1− λ1) + ηλ1] + εf [(1− λ1) + λ1π + ηλ1 (1− π)]
(12)
where η = 1− F (x− x) denotes the proportion of young women who turned down o¤ers of marriage in the
preceding period. If η = 0, the expression in (12) is identical to that in (3). As η increases, εf2 declines; i.e.
there is a fall in the probability of bad character among older women on the marriage market. In addition,
the number of older women in the marriage market will go up with the proportion of young women who
declined o¤ers of marriage in the preceding period (represented by η′ below):
nf2 = [1− λ1 + λ1εfπ + η
′λ1 (1− εfπ)] y (13)
Equations (18) and (12) together yield, for given θt and θt+1, the threshold value xt = xˆ (x, θt, θt+1) above
which young women turn down o¤ers of marriage and the proportion of women who do so, ηt = 1−F (xt − x).
(We suppress the parameter x in the function xˆ (.) hereafter in this section for ease of notation).
As per the reasoning above, the expected utility to potential grooms from seeking a young bride, in a
given period t, will depend on xt while the expected utility from seeking an older bride will depend on xt−1
since it determines, as per (12), the reputation of older women in the current period. We can therefore
represent the expected utilities by Uˆ1 (θt, θt+1, xt) and Uˆ2 (θt, θt−1, xt−1) respectively. Using these expected
utility functions, we can dene a function Iˆ (.) akin to the function I (.) introduced in Section 3.3:
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Denition 4
Iˆ (θt−1, xt−1, θt+1) =


θ if Uˆ1 (θ, θt+1, xt) = Uˆ2 (θ, θt−1, xt−1) for some θ ∈ [0, 1]
0 if Uˆ1 (θ, θt+1, xt) < Uˆ2 (θ, θt−1, xt−1) for each θ ∈ [0, 1]
1 if Uˆ1 (θ, θt+1, xt) > Uˆ2 (θ, θt−1, xt−1) for each θ ∈ [0, 1]
where xt = xˆ (θ, θt+1).
Using the denition of Iˆ (θt−1, xt−1, θt+1), we can provide a characterisation of equilibria as follows.
Proposition 6 Given initial values θ0 and x0, a sequence {θτ , xτ}
∞
τ=1 constitutes a marriage market equi-
librium if and only if, we have θt = Iˆ (θt−1, xt−1, θt+1), and xt = x (θt, θt+1), for t = 1, 2, ....
There exists a steady-state equilibrium at θ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if θ = Iˆ (θ, x, θ) where x = xˆ (θ, θ). In
other words, if the proportion of men seeking young brides, and the threshold value above which women
decline o¤ers of marriage, are equal to θ and xˆ (θ, θ) respectively in some period, and θ = Iˆ (θ, xˆ (θ, θ) , θ),
then there exists an equilibrium where these values remain the same in all future periods.
4.1 The E¤ects of Policy Changes and Shocks on the Marriage Market
In this section, we address the question how policy changes or shocks that change the outside options of
young brides a¤ect the marriage market. The result we highlight is that even policies and shocks that have
transitory e¤ects  i.e. a¤ect some cohorts on the marriage market only  can have a long-term e¤ect on the
marriage market equilibrium path. To make the result stark, we consider the case where there is a change
in the outside option for one cohort only as described in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose that {(θt, xt)}
∞
t=0 is a marriage market equilibrium path with iterated expectations.
A transitory shock which improves (worsens) the outside option for young women entering the marriage




where θ˜t ≤ θt and x˜t ≤ xt (θ˜t ≥ θt and x˜t ≥ xt) for t ≥ τ and strict inequality from period
τ + 2 onwards.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is as follows. A shock which improves the outside option for young
women in period τ would induce some fraction of them to refuse marriage o¤ers that they would have
otherwise accepted. Their refusals improve the reputation of older women on the marriage market in the
next period. Therefore, in period τ + 1, a higher fraction of men seek younger brides than in the initial
equilibrium path which, in turn, improves the reputation of older women in the following period and the
cycle continues. Thus, a policy targeted at  or a shock experienced by  one cohort of adolescent girls only
a¤ects the marriage market prospects of future cohorts as well.
These e¤ects apply whether, when the shock occurs, the marriage market is in steady-state or on a
dynamic path towards a steady-state. If the initial shock is large enough  and there are multiple steady-
states  then it may lead the marriage market towards a new steady-state with a lower incidence of early
marriage.
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If the marriage market has only one steady-state then the e¤ects of the shock depends on whether the
current incidence of early marriage was above, at or below that implied by the steady-state. If it was below,
then the shock accelerates the evolution towards the steady-state; while if it is below, the shock decelerates
the evolution towards it. If the marriage market was in steady-state when the shock occurred, then it
moves onto a dynamic path with a lower incidence of early marriage before eventually returning to the same
steady-state.
Additionally, Proposition 7 implies that, in the case of a policy which applies to successive cohorts, the
full e¤ect of the policy will not be evident in the initial cohorts who are exposed to it.
5 An Application to Early Marriage in Bangladesh
In the preceding sections, we developed an overlapping-generations model of marriage timing and provided
a theoretical characterisation of the marriage market equilibrium within this model. In this section, we
explore how well such a model can explain phenomena related to early marriage, in particular changes in the
incidence of early marriage over time. We also use the model to provide insights about how the incidence of
early marriage would respond to government interventions and demographic shocks.
For the numerical analysis, we calibrate the model using the context of Bangladesh. The assumptions
of the model are, arguably, a good approximation of the key marriage patterns in Bangladesh, which is
characterised by low incidence of divorce and polygamy, and high rates of exogamy.13 According to the
gures available from the latest Demographic and Health Survey, about 65% of women aged 20-24 years
were married by the age of 18 (NIPORT 2013) and Bangladesh has one of the highest rates of early marriage
for women in the world today (UNFPA 2012). The 1929 Child Marriage Restraint Act imposed a minimum
age of marriage, which is presently 18 for women and 21 for men. However, this law is frequently ignored
and rarely enforced. For adolescent girls in Bangladesh, marriage brings about a sudden change in roles and
responsibilities. It typically involves leaving school and withdrawing from the labour market to undertake
household duties (Amin et al. 2014; Amin, Mahmud & Huq, 2002).
Despite the high incidence of early marriage among women in Bangladesh today, it is important to
recognise that the average age of marriage has not been stationary. The following gures show how the
incidence of early marriage among girls in Bangladesh has evolved over a twenty-year period, using data
from the Bangladesh Womens Life Choices and Attitudes Survey (WiLCAS 2014).14 We see that for
cohorts born between 1975 and 1981, the proportions marrying early were more or less constant, but it
has declined for each of the subsequent cohorts. This decline has been attributed to both decreased cost of
schooling for girls as a result of government initiatives on tuition and stipend programmes (Schurmann 2009,
Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009) as well as increased labour market opportunities for women, in particular
13 In the 2011 Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey, among women aged 15-49 years, 1% are divorced. Among married
men in the same age group, less than 1% are in polygynous marriages (NIPORT 2013). As for exogamy, we nd among married
female respondents (aged 20-39 years) in the 2014 Bangladesh WiLCAS that 88% had no family connection with their husband
prior to marriage.
14The Bangladesh WiLCAS 2014 is a nationally representative survey of women aged 20-39 years with information on
education, employment, marriage, childbirth, and beliefs and attitudes funded by Australian Aid through the Australian
Development Research Awards Scheme. Further information about the survey can be obtained from Asadullah and Wahhaj
(2017).
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in the ready-made garments sector (Heath and Mobarak 2015).
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Recent data shows that, except for a small fraction, most women in Bangladesh today marry after reach-
ing menarche (Asadullah and Wahhaj 2017). But older demographic surveys indicate that pre-pubescent
marriages were the norm at least until the rst part of the mid-twentieth century (see, for example, Schultz
and DaVanzo 1970). The literature suggests that there has been a gradual shift in the norm from pre-
pubescent to post-pubescent marriage in South Asia, with social pressures to marry o¤ girls before menarche
giving away, initially, to an acceptance that the procedure could be postponed until menarche (Caldwell,
Reddy, Caldwell 1983).
5.1 Evidence regarding Moral Behaviour
Before proceeding to the numerical analysis, we provide some empirical evidence on the signicance of
purity or moral character in the lives of rural Bangladeshi women. In Section 2, we referenced the
sociological literature to argue that these concepts were closely related to the sexual behaviour of the women
concerned. It is rare for a large-scale survey in Bangladesh to include questions on sexual behaviour outside
of marriage. One survey which included such questions is the Bangladesh Adolescent Survey (BAS), a
nationally representative survey of 10-24 year olds, conducted by the Population Council in 2005.15 The
BAS included the question "Do you know of anyone among your friends and neighbours who had sexual
experiences prior to marriage?", to which 28% of boys/men (N = 5,119) and 17% of girls/women (N = 6,867)
answered "yes". This is followed by the question "What are reasons/causes for pre-marital sex", to which
18% of male respondents and 36% of female respondents responded "ones own bad behaviour" (up to three
reasons could be provided). In the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Surveys (BDHS), (ever-married)
male and female respondents are asked about their own sexual behaviour and, in particular, the age at which
15Gani (2007) provides a detailed description of the survey.
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they initiated sexual activity. In contrast to the gures from the BAS, none of the women in the BDHS
report engaging in premarital sex although some men do (NIPORT 2013, 2016). The combined evidence
from the BAS and BDHS indicates that while some fraction of women engage in pre-marital sex, they are
unwilling to admit to such behaviour in a formal survey, possibly to avoid judgement by the enumerator
or the risk of this information becoming more widely known. Thus, pre-marital sex appears to be a social
taboo for women.
Figure 5 shows the proportion of respondents in the BAS who answered yes to the question on the sexual
experiences of friends and neighbours according to the respondents age and gender. In the case of male
respondents, the proportion increases steadily with age, from about 15% among 12-13 year-olds to 51%
among 22-24 year-olds. By contrast, for female respondents, the proportion increases till the age group of
16-17 year-olds and remains on a plateau thereafter. If we assume that the respondents are reporting on
the behaviour of friends of the same gender and of a similar age, these patterns are consistent with the
idea that the women who experience pre-marital sex have already done so by the time they are 18, and the
remaining women do not engage in sex till after marriage. In other words, a xed proportion of women
have the propensity to engage in pre-marital sex; i.e. the behaviour is driven by a xed character trait.
As described above, more than a third of female adolescent respondents to the BAS are willing to make a
moral judgement regarding those who do, and it is reasonable to assume that this type of judgement will be
at least as widespread on the marriage market. Furthermore, while the survey questions focus specically
on pre-marital sex, in practice these moral judgements are likely to apply to a wider set of behaviour as
discussed in Section 3.2.
Figure 5: Evidence on Pre-Marital Sex
5.2 Model Calibration
We calibrate the model based on the marriage market conditions for women born between 1975 and 1982.
Since the incidence of early marriage was relatively stable during this period (as noted above) we assume,
for the purpose of this calibration, that the marriage market is in steady-state. Table 1 shows the functional
forms used for the numerical analysis: the utility function is linear and the matching function takes a Cobb-
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Douglas form. It is straightforward to verify that these functional forms satisfy Assumptions 1-5. The
functional form for the matching function is motivated by the use of log-linear functions for the estimation
of matching functions, and evidence found in favour of constant returns to scale, in a wide range of studies
(see Mortensen and Pissarides 1999; and Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001).
We let m0 = 0.90 which implies that when there are equal number of men and women in one segment of
the marriage market, 90% of them nd matches. The assumption of a high match probability is reasonable
given that each search period in the model corresponds to 4.5 years. The qualitative ndings from simulating
the model, discussed below, is not sensitive to the precise value assumed for m0.
The values of the functional parameters π, σ and γ are chosen to match the steady-state values to
key moments in the data; specically, the proportion of women who have early marriages, the ratio of
equilibrium marriage transfers for older brides to that for younger brides, and the proportion of women who
remain unmarried at the end of their second period in the marriage market. The full set of data moments
that enter the numerical analysis, as well as the data sources, are shown in Table 2.
Table 1: Functional Form Assumptions for Numerical Analysis
Function Functional Form Used Parameter Values
Utility
u˜m (τ , cf ) = τ + σcf













= f (nm, nf )
m0 = 0.9, γ estimated
Table 2: Data-Moments
Data Moment Value Source
% Married before 18, Females born 1975-82 72.05% 2014 WiLCAS
Mean Dowry for Brides < 18, Females born 1975-82 Tk 7,131 2014 WiLCAS
Mean Dowry for Brides >= 18, Females born 1975-82 Tk 14,887 2014 WiLCAS
Std. dev. of Dowry, Brides < 18, born 1975-82 Tk 36,713 2014 WiLCAS
Females 15-19 yrs, 1980 6.474m UN Pop. Div.16
Females 20-24 yrs 1980 5.501m UN Pop. Div.
Males 15-19 yrs, 1980 6.695m UN Pop. Div.
Males 20-24 yrs, 1980 5.701m UN Pop. Div.
% Never Married, Female 25-29 yrs 2.2% 1993/94 DHS
Recall that the utility obtained from being single during one period, represented by um, uf1 and uf2
in the model, are exogenously given. For older women, we set the utility from remaining single equal to
that derived from marriage to a man of bad character with zero transfers. This assumption is intended
to capture the strong social pressures of marriage for women and can be backed by anecdotal evidence on
women unwilling to leave husbands who are prone to abuse and violence.17 For men, we set the utility from
remaining single equal to that derived from marriage to a woman of bad character and a positive transfer
equal to 1 unit. This is intended to capture the asymmetry in social pressures and economic opportunities
between men and women, as well as provide a precise meaning for a 1 unit transfer. Finally, given that
educational and economic opportunities were limited for both young and older women during the period
16World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision
17See, for example, Bloch and Rao (2002).
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under consideration, we x uf1 = uf2: i.e. the utility from singlehood is the same for young women and
older women (Note that, where there is a positive incidence of early marriage, young women on the marriage
market will, nevertheless, have better outside options then older women because they have higher chances
of being married). We also x η = 0 for the moment-matching exercise  i.e. we assume that no marriage
o¤ers are refused in the initial steady-state but we allow η to adjust for the subsequent simulations.
In addition, we set β = 0.77 and ε = 0.05. Given that each period in the model corresponds to 4.5 years,
the value assumed for β represents an annual discount factor of 0.94, which is broadly in line with assumptions
made in the macroeconomics literature. The value chosen for ε is guided by: (i) the fact that a lower value
causes the estimated π to hit its constraint at 1 and (ii) a signicantly higher value seems improbable as it
would translate into a signicant pattern of marriage partners of bad character being found-out following
marriage, and there is limited evidence of this in the context of Bangladesh.18
For the moment-matching exercise, we solve a system of 11 equations in 11 unknowns listed in Appendix
B. The values of the parameters γ, σ and π, and the steady-state values for variables in the system thus
obtained are reported in Table 2B.
Table 2B: Parameters and Steady-State Values from Moment-Matching Exercise
variable θ λ1 εf2 λ2 nf2 τ2 τ1 vf1
steady-state value 0.705 0.751 0.152 0.935 0.243 0.491 0.235 1.978
parameter γ σ π
steady-state value 0.5952 1.2212 0.8015
Note that the theory nests a model in which the age of potential brides is not associated with quality:
this is obtained when π = 0: which would mean that there is, e¤ectively, no mechanism to detect the
quality of potential brides. The fact that we obtain a high value for π in the moment-matching exercise, and
consequently a signicantly worse reputation for older women (εf2 = 0.1522 while εf1 = 0.05) suggests that
the key marriage patterns in Bangladesh are consistent with strong reputational e¤ects which results in an
endogenous preference for young brides.
Figure 6 shows a plot of I (θ, θ) against θ for the model calibrated to the marriage market in Bangladesh.
The curve crosses the 45-degree line at just one point. This occurs at θ = 0.7160 . Therefore, the model
implies that given the sex ratios, population growth rate and outside options for men and women relative to
marriage during the late 1980s in Bangladesh, there was only one feasible steady-state equilibrium, with a
high proportion of men seeking young brides.
18Recall from the previous section that a quarter of female adolescents in the BAS aged 18 and over know of friends and
neighbours who have engaged in pre-marital sex. Assuming that such behaviour would be equated with bad moral character if
it became known during marriage market negotiations, a value of ε = 0.05 would imply that when a girl engages in pre-marital,
this information is shared, on average, with 5 friends and neighbours.
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Figure 6: Steady-State in Calibrated Model


































In the following sections, we use the calibrated model to explore how the marriage market would evolve
in response to demographic shocks and policy changes and compare the model dynamics to that observed in
the data. For the simulations, we assume that the outside options of young women are normally distributed
and we choose the standard deviation of the distribution to equate the standard deviation of τ1 to that of
dowries for young brides in the data.
5.3 Demographic Changes and the Incidence of Early Marriage
Bangladesh experienced a sharp decline in fertility between the 1970s and the 1990s, a phenomenon which
is commonly attributed to family planning programmes launched in the late 1970s (see, for example, Joshi
and Schultz 2007). The total fertility rate fell from 6.3 in 1975 to 3.4 in 1994 (NIPORT 2013). The rate of
population growth can have important implications for the marriage market due to a phenomenon known
as the marriage squeeze (Rao 1993; Bhat and Halli 1999). Within the framework of the theory presented
above, a growing population makes the cohort of young women larger than that of older men, which increases
the chances of success of potential grooms seeking young brides. Conversely, a sudden decline in fertility will
translate into increased di¢culty in nding young brides 14-18 years later which could explain, in principle,
why early marriage in Bangladesh began to decline for cohorts born after 1982. To explore this possibility,
we introduce a demographic shock to the model, assuming it is initially in a steady-state, and examine how
the incidence of early marriage evolves in subsequent years. Specically, we reduce the cohort growth rate
from 15% to 5% (recall that each cohort in the model corresponds to an age group of 4.5 years), keeping all
other parameter values as discussed in the preceding section.
Table 3 below compares the proportion of women married before age 18 in the data, and according to the
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calibrated model following the demographic shock, for the cohorts born in 1975-82 and subsequent 5-year
age groups.19
Table 3: % Married before Age 18, Data and Simulation of Demographic Shock
Cohort (Year-of-Birth) Data (2014 WiLCAS) Naive Expec. Forward-Looking
1975-82 72.05 72.05 72.05
1983-87 65.12 73.45 73.43
1987-91 61.22 73.84 73.85
1992-96 48.58 73.85 73.85
New Steady-State - 73.85 73.85
Table 4: Simulated Values for Demographic Shock (Naive Expectations)
Cohort (Year-of-Birth) θ λ1 εf2
Initial Steady-State 0.705 0.7506 0.1522
1983-87 0.68 0.7674 0.1522
1987-91 0.69 0.7720 0.1597
1992-96 0.69 0.7720 0.1619
New Steady-State 0.69 0.7720 0.1620
We consider two scenarios for the model simulations: (i) agents have naive expectations (as dened in
Section 3.4) and (ii) agents have forward-looking expectations. The proportion married before 18 for birth
cohorts 1972-1982 is identical in the simulations and the data as the parameter values of γ, σ and π are
chosen to match data-moments. For subsequent birth cohorts, the simulations show an increase in early
marriage, contrary to the data which shows a sharp decline (Table 3).
The reason for the counter-intuitive increase in early marriage in the simulations is as follows. As per our
intuition, the proportion of men who seek young brides (θ) initially decline due to the demographic shock;
but they have relatively fewer young women to choose from and this results in an increase in the proportion
of women who receive o¤ers of early marriage (λ1) as shown in Table 4 (We provide only the calculated values
for naive expectations as the case of forward-looking expectations path is very similar in this instance). The
increase in early marriage causes the reputation of older women on the marriage market to worsen (εf2),
and therefore, the proportion of men seeking young brides increase again in subsequent periods. Overall, a
decline in population growth rate has little net e¤ect on the incidence of early marriage.20
As discussed in Section 2, a decline in fertility can a¤ect female marriage age by increasing the demand
for older, more educated brides, e¤ects which are not captured in these simulations. Nevertheless, the
mechanism highlighted here o¤ers an explanation as to why, in some developing countries, female age of
marriage has evolved gradually in spite of rapid fertility transitions.21
It is meaningful to ask whether the previously high rates of fertility were an important driver behind early
marriage in Bangladesh and whether the fertility decline mentioned above had a role in the subsequent shift
19Note that two of the age-cohorts reported in the table, (1983-1987) and (1987-1991), have an overlap of one year. This is
to ensure that the data is roughly comparable to the model where each period is approximately 4.5 years.
20 It is signicant that when the market has reached a new steady-state, following the demographic shock, the reputation of
older women in the marriage market is worse than what it had been in the initial equilibrium. This is because in the new
demographic phase following the fertility decline, where there are more potential grooms for every potential young bride, the
presence of an older woman in the marriage market is even more suspect than it had previously been.
21For example, in Bangladesh, India and Nepal, fertility has declined and female schooling has increased signicantly during
the last three decades but the incidence of early marriage has evolved much more slowly (Raj, McDougal and Rusch 2012).
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towards later marriage. As noted above, the incidence of early marriage among women show a downward
trend beginning with cohorts born after 1981. These women would be expected to bear children starting
in the mid-1990s. By this time, the total fertility rate had already fallen to 3.4, and it remained more or
less stagnant till the 2000s.22 Therefore, fertility demand on its own cannot explain the decline in early
marriage for cohorts born during the 1980s. According to the fertility data in the 2014 WiLCAS, among
women who had 3 or more children, 63% met this criteria based only on births at age 19 and later. Thus,
it is unlikely that women marrying at 18 as compared to 15 were at a signicant disadvantage for achieving
a fertility target of 3 or 4 children.
5.4 Changes in the Opportunity Cost of Early Marriage
The opportunities available to adolescent girls in Bangladesh have expanded signicantly since the 1980s.
First, the Bangladesh government introduced a number of educational reforms and initiatives that lowered
the cost  and improved access  to schooling for Bangladeshi women: in 1990, free tuition was introduced
for all girls enrolled in classes VI-VIII, and in 1994, a female secondary school stipend programme was
launched, extending to all non-metropolitan areas in the country by 2000 (Schurmann 2009). In 1993, a food-
for-education programme  whereby households received grain for the government if they had one or more
children enrolled in primary school  was introduced in rural areas (Ahmed and Nino 2002), and subsequently
this initiative was converted to a cash-for-education programme. Second, the labour market opportunities
improved signicantly, most notably because of the dramatic growth of the ready-made garments sector
which today employs more than three million women (Heath and Mobarak 2015).
Marriage for Bangladeshi women has traditionally meant the termination of schooling and withdrawal
from the labour market, as this is the moment when they begin to live with their in-laws, take on new domestic
responsibilities and practise a certain degree of social seclusion (Amin and Suran 2009). Therefore, the
initiatives in education and the changes in the labour market highlighted above expanded the opportunities
for single women to a much greater extent than they did for married women. Thus, arguably, these initiatives
and changes increased the opportunity cost of early marriage for Bangladeshi women.
If so, it is reasonable to model these changes as an increase in the utility that young women derive from
singlehood.23 Such an increase would raise the probability that a young woman declines an o¤er of marriage,
and decreases the net marriage transfer that can be obtained from her (because her outside option during
the bargaining process is higher). Consequently, it will be less attractive for a potential groom to seek a
young bride, and this could result in a decline in early marriage.
To explore this possibility, we introduce an increase in the utility from singlehood for young women,
assuming it is initially in steady-state, and investigate how the marriage market evolves in subsequent
periods. Specically, we increase the utility from singlehood for all young women by half the standard
22According to the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Surveys, the total fertility rate was 3.4 in 1993/94, 3.3 in 1996/1997,
3.3 in 1999/2000 and 3.0 in 2004 (NIPORT 2013). See also footnote 6 for the choice of the total fertility rate for this discussion.
23We assume, implicitly, that the intervention does not impact upon the outside option of older women on the marriage
market or their contributions to marriage. In the context of Bangladesh, these e¤ects are likely to be small as there is a strong
social stigma associated with spinsterhood (documented, for example, by Rozario 1992) and labour force participation among
married women remains low (NIPORT 2013).
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deviation of the utility distribution.




θ λ1 εf2 η
Steady-State 72.05 0.705 0.7506 0.1522 0.0026
Period 1 68.67 0.64 0.7218 0.1522 0.0089
Period 2 66.73 0.60 0.7031 0.1369 0.0114
Period 3 64.26 0.57 0.6887 0.1295 0.0127
Period 4 63.73 0.55 0.6738 0.1245 0.0138
New Steady-State 63.20 0.53 0.6687 0.1181 0.0154




θ λ1 εf2 η
Steady-State 72.05 0.705 0.7506 0.1522 0.0026
Period 1 66.33 0.60 0.7031 0.1522 0.0173
Period 2 64.10 0.55 0.6788 0.1281 0.0163
Period 3 63.20 0.53 0.6687 0.1208 0.0154
Period 4 63.20 0.53 0.6687 0.1181 0.0154
New Steady-State 63.20 0.53 0.6687 0.1181 0.0154
In Table 5a, we see that, in the case of naive expectations, the increase in the utility from singlehood
results in a 6.5 percentage point decline in the % of men seeking young brides (θ) for the rst cohort exposed
to the shock. The value of θ declines further for subsequent cohorts, reaching a new steady-state value of
0.53 after 8 periods. We also see that the reputation of older women in the marriage market (εf2) improves
over time after the shock and the proportion of young women declining o¤ers of early marriage (η), albeit
very small, is increasing over time. The co-evolution of θ, εf2 and η captures a virtuous cycle as follows. As a
result of increased utility from singlehood from the intervention, young women have greater bargaining power
and can negotiate a lower dowry. Therefore, fewer men make marriage o¤ers to them, and this improves the
reputation of older women on the marriage market the following period. This causes more men to seek older
brides and more women to decline o¤ers of early marriage which leads to a further increase in the reputation
of older women next period. And thus the cycle continues. The evolution of the marriage market is similar
in the case of forward-looking expectations (Table 5b) but the steady-state is reached more quickly.24
The incidence of early marriage declines by about 9 percentage points when the new steady-state is
reached, which is roughly half the magnitude of the decline in θ.25 But the rst cohort which exposed to the
shock experiences a decline in the early marriage rate in the range of 3.4 to 5.7 percentage points (depending
on whether expectations are naive or forward-looking). Therefore, the e¤ect of the shock on the rst cohort
only captures about one-third to two-third of the total e¤ect on early marriage by the time that the new
steady-state is reached.
24One di¤erence of note in the case of forward-looking expectations is that the marriage refusal rate initially jumps and then
declines to the new steady-state value. This is because young women anticipate that they will have better reputation than
their elders if they re-enter the marriage market next period and, therefore, are more willing to decline current marriage o¤ers.
However, as the marriage market evolves towards late marriage, their outside options improve, and they are able to negotiate
better terms of marriage (lower dowry) in the current period and so the refusal rate starts to fall.
25The reason for the disparity between the change in θ and λ1 is that as fewer men seek young brides, the chances of success
increase for those who continue to do so; this is evident in the fact that, for a young woman, the probability of receiving a
marriage o¤er (λ1) falls at about half the rate of θ following the shock.
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Next, we tackle the question how much the outside opportunities of young women would have to increase
to obtain the decline in early marriage we observe in the data. We also incorporate the e¤ects of the fertility
decline which occurred in Bangladesh since the late 1970s as discussed above. Table 6 shows the evolution
of early marriage when we allow the utility from singlehood to increase at a constant rate by 1 standard
deviation of the utility distribution over three cohorts. We nd that the equilibrium path for forward-looking
expectations matches the data reasonably well while that for naive expectations lag behind.
Table 6: % Married before Age 18, Simulation of Increased Opportunities + Demographic Shock
Cohort (Year-of-Birth) Data (2014 WiLCAS) Naive Expec. Forward-Looking
1975-82 72.05 72.05 72.05
1983-87 65.12 71.80 67.01
1987-91 61.22 68.00 59.34
1992-96 48.58 60.00 50.95
New Steady-State - 49.19 49.19
5.5 Randomised Control Trials relating to Early Marriage
The current gold standard for testing the e¢cacy of development interventions, including those targeted at
adolescents, is to run small-scale randomised control trials (RCTs). It is well-known that the potential e¤ect
that a scaled-up intervention may have on market equilibria or on social norms may be missed in a small
scale RCT as the trial may be insu¢cient to achieve the hypothesized equilibrium shifts (see, for example,
Duo et al. 2007, Banerjee and Duo 2009). In the case of programmes aimed at reducing early marriage,
the equilibrium e¤ects are likely to be important as discussed above, and therefore a small-scale trial may
signicantly under-estimate the e¢cacy of the intervention under consideration. The theory proposed in
this paper  where the marriage market and social norms play important roles  provides a good setting to
evaluate how signicant this under-estimation is likely to be.
In the following, we simulate a number of scenarios where x% of young women in the population benet
from an intervention that increase their opportunity cost of early marriage by half a standard deviation of
the utility distribution. The marriage market is initially in the steady-state computed above. We assume
that the programme beneciaries are identiable if they re-enter the marriage market as older women and,
therefore, they can potentially have a di¤erent reputation from non-beneciaries (if, for example, they had
a di¤erent marriage refusal rate). To abstract away from di¤erences arising from the speed at which the
market adjusts to the intervention, we focus on the new steady-state values following the intervention.
First, we consider the case where x = 10%; i.e. where one in every ten young women in the marriage
market, chosen at random, are exposed to the programme.26 From Table 7, we see that the rate of early
marriage  for programme beneciaries  falls by about 1.4 percentage points. For x = 20%, the correspond-
ing gure is about 1.9 percentage points. By contrast, when all women in the population are beneciaries
of the intervention, the rate of early marriage declines by 9 percentage points.
26To have a sense of the scale of an RCT with x = 10% in the context of Bangladesh, we can proceed as follows. According
to the 2005 Bangladesh Adolescent Survey, 63% of married adolescents have a marriage partner from the same sub-district and,
therefore, we can take the sub-district to be a very rough approximation of the typical size of the marriage market. According
to the 2011 Population Census of Bangladesh, the average size of a sub-district is about 250,000 and the number of female
adolescents aged 15-19 within the sub-district about 13,000. Therefore, the intervention would have to target 1,300 adolescent
girls in the sub-district.
34
The main channel through which these e¤ects occur is by changing the expected utility to a potential
groom from seeking young brides. A programme beneciary is more likely to refuse a marriage o¤er or
negotiate a more favourable marriage transfer for herself and this makes her less attractive from the per-
spective of the man. However, in the case of a small-scale intervention, the chances that the potential groom
seeking a young bride is matched with a programme beneciary remains low and therefore the impact on
the equilibrium is small. In particular, the gures in Table 7 suggest that a trial targeting x% of adolescents
in the marriage market will shift θ  the proportion of men seeking young brides  by roughly x% of that
of the full-scale intervention. On the other hand, the small-scale trials are able to capture reasonably well
the direct e¤ect on early marriage refusals: η = 0.0105 for the 10% intervention as opposed to 0.0154 for the
fully scaled-up programme.




θ λ1 εf2 η
Initial Steady-State 72.05 0.705 0.7506 0.1456 0.0026
10% 70.63 0.69 0.7441 0.1454 0.0105
20% 70.19 0.68 0.7397 0.1434 0.0115
50% 67.49 0.62 0.7125 0.1323 0.0133
100% 63.20 0.53 0.6687 0.1181 0.0154
6 Implications of Polygamy, Divorce, Remarriage and Alternative
Mating Rules
For the main analysis in this paper, we imposed a number of restrictions on the marriage market  regarding
divorce and remarriage, and polygamy  arguing that, in the case of marriages in South Asia, they have a low
enough incidence to justify the simplifying assumptions. However, there are other parts of the world with
a high prevalence of female child marriage as well as divorce and polygamy, most notably in sub-Saharan
Africa. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether and to what extent the main implications of the theoretical
model are valid for other parts of the world.
If polygyny is socially permissible, it would mean that married men may re-enter the marriage market
in a future period. This would increase competition on the grooms side of the market and a¤ect the
matching probabilities for both brides and grooms. If divorced men are able to remarry, this would have
similar implications. However, older women on the marriage market would still have worse reputation, and,
therefore, the driver behind early marriage, highlighted in the preceding sections, would still be relevant.
If divorced women are able to remarry, it would mean that some fraction of women who marry re-enter
the marriage market in a future period. It is reasonable to assume that their previous marital history will be
public knowledge and, therefore, they will be distinguishable from both young women (entering the marriage
market for the rst time) and older women who have not been married previously. Therefore, potential
grooms would have the possibility of choosing between three types of potential brides rather than two. In
any case, older never-married women on the marriage market would still have worse reputation than young
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women for the reasons highlighted in the previous sections. Once again, the driver behind early marriage
obtained in the theoretical analysis will be relevant.
We assumed, for the theoretical model, that men are the rst to act  choosing whether to seek young or
older brides  while women can accept or decline o¤ers of marriage, in line with traditional marriage customs
in South Asia. If, instead, the theory allows women to initiate a search, men would accept or decline
marriage o¤ers based on their beliefs regarding the character of the potential bride and the reputational
e¤ects associated with the age of the bride would still be present.
In summary, remarriage and polygamy, where they are relevant, would need to be taken into account in
the numerical analysis. But the main insights from the theoretical model do not depend on the assumptions
made regarding their absence. On the other hand, the value placed on the purity of the bride and rules
regarding marriage exogamy  which would result in imperfect information regarding this characteristic on
the marriage market  are key for the mechanism behind child marriage highlighted in this paper.
7 Discussion
In recent years, international donors and development agencies have designed and implemented a range of
interventions aimed at expanding the economic and educational opportunities of adolescents, particularly
girls, in developing countries; with the reduction of the incidence of early marriage and postponement of
childbirth among their intended goals.
In this context, it is important to realise that decisions regarding the timing of marriage of a son or
daughter, although they are made within a single household, may be inuenced by the choices made by
other households in the community or region. In this paper, we investigated a particular mechanism through
which these individual choices can inuence the costs and benets of early marriage versus late marriage for
everyone in a marriage market: if some qualities of prospective brides are not fully observable at the time
of marriage, then the incidence of early marriage will inuence the perceived quality of older women on the
marriage market.
One of the key innovations in the theory proposed in this paper is the signalling and reputational e¤ect
associated with marriage timing for women: marriage delays signal bad quality and this imposes a pressure
on women to accept early o¤ers of marriage and a preference among potential grooms to seek young brides. It
is important to note that the theory also nests a model in which the age of potential brides is not associated
with quality. This is equivalent to the case where π = 0: which would mean that there is, e¤ectively, no
mechanism to detect the quality of potential brides and, therefore, if an older woman is still on the marriage
market it is only because she did not nd a match, or refused a marriage o¤er, in her youth.
In calibrating the model to the case of Bangladesh, we allowed π to be computed so that the steady-
state variables match the data-moments. We obtained π = 0.8015, which means that in about 4 out of
5 instances, a background check can reveal the quality of a potential bride with bad character. Thus,
the moment-matching exercise generates signicant reputational concerns and an endogenous preference for
young brides which can account for key marriage patterns in Bangladesh.
In this situation, expanding opportunities for some adolescent girls  to the extent that they or their
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parents choose to postpone their marriage  can trigger a virtuous cycle whereby the perceived quality of
older brides improve, which in turn makes it more attractive for other girls to postpone marriage, and so on.
In a study of the timing of marriage and childbearing in rural Bangladesh (Schuler et al., 2006), this idea is
succinctly captured in a reported interview with an 18-year-old girl:
... when asked why her parents had delayed her marriage while her younger sisters had
married at ages 12-15 ... [she replied] "My father thought it was unnecessary for girls to read and
write but in my case he did not object ... None of my peers were sitting idle at home so I also
went to school. Now it is better for girls. They dont have to pay school fees  the government
nances it ... Everyone has had some schooling, at least up to the eighth or ninth grade. No one
would want to marry an illiterate girl so they are sent to school." p. 2831
The fact that an intervention targeted at adolescent girls can make it more and more attractive for
future cohorts to postpone marriage means that the long-term impact of such interventions on marriage and
subsequent life choices may well exceed the impact on the rst cohort which is exposed to it.
8 Appendix A
First, we state and prove Lemma 4, which is used in the proof of Lemma 1. Lemma 4 shows that an indi-
viduals utility from marriage declines as the probability of bad character of the marriage partner increases,
even though marriage partners with worse reputation are cheaper in terms of net marriage transfers.
Lemma 4 If τ∗ = argmaxτ {ζum (τ , εf )− vm} {ζuf (τ , εm)− vf} then, under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the
expression {ζum (τ , εf )− vm} is decreasing in εf and {ζuf (τ , εm)− vf} is decreasing in εm.
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We show by contradiction that {ζum (τ
∗, εf )− vm} is decreasing in εf . Suppose not. Then, when εf is
larger, {ζum (τ
∗, εf )− vm} remains the same or becomes larger, {ζuf (τ , εm)− vf} is smaller and, because
∂τ∗
∂εf
> 0, by Assumption 3
∂uf
∂τ
is (weakly) more negative and ∂um
∂τ
is (weakly) smaller. Then equation (14)
would be violated. Therefore, we must have {ζum (τ




< 0 and {ζuf (τ , εm)− vf} is decreasing in εm.
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is strictly decreasing in θt. Therefore, using the
denitions of U1 (θt, θt+1) and U2 (θt, θt−1) in (10) and (11), we have U1 (θt, θt+1) strictly decreasing in θt
and U2 (θt, θt−1) is strictly increasing in θt.




, is increasing in









. It follows from equation (10) and Assumption 1 that U1
is increasing in θt+1.
(iii) Using (3), εf2 in period t is increasing in λ1 in period t − 1. Using (1), λ1 is increasing in θt−1.
Therefore, εf2 is increasing in θt−1. Then, using equations (11) and (8), Assumption 3 and Lemma 4 that
U2 is decreasing in θt−1.
Proof. of Lemma 2: Dene J (θ) = I (θ, θ)− θ. Given that um (.),  (.) and ξ (.) are continuous functions,
so is J (.). By construction, J (θ) ≥ 0 at θ = 0 and J (θ) ≤ 0 at θ = 1. If J (0) = 0 or J (1) = 0, then the
corresponding θ value would constitute a steady-state. If J (0) > 0 and J (1) < 0, then it follows from the
Intermediate Value Theorem that there exists some θ ∈ [0, 1] such that J (θ) = 0. Therefore, I (θ, θ) = θ.
Proof. of Proposition 2: Given θ0, we can construct a sequence {θτ}
∞
τ=1 as follows. Let θt+1 = I (θt, θt) for
t = 1, 2, ... By construction, the sequence {θτ}
∞
τ=1, together with the initial value θ0, satises the denition
of a Naive Expectations equilibrium (Denition 3). Furthermore, as I (., .) is increasing in both arguments





can satisfy Denition 3. Therefore, given the initial value
θ0, there is a unique sequence that satises the criteria of the Naive Expectations Equilibrium.
(i) Suppose I (θ0, θ0) > θ0. As I (1, 1) ≤ 1, and I (., .) is a continuous function, it follows that there
exists at least one steady-state value in the interval (θ0, 1]. Let us denote the rst (i.e. smallest) of these
steady-state values as θs; i.e. I (θs, θs) = θs. By continuity of I (., .), we have θ < I (θ, θ) for θ ∈ [θ0, θs).
By construction, θ1 = I (θ0, θ0). Since θ0 < I (θ0, θ0), we have θ1 > θ0. We can show by contradiction
that θ1 < θs. Dene K (θ) = I (θ, θ). By Lemma 1, K (θ) is increasing in θ. Therefore, K
−1 (.) is an
increasing function. Therefore, if θ1 > θs, then K
−1 (θ1) > K
−1 (θs). By construction, K (θ0) = I (θ0, θ0) =
θ1. Therefore K
−1 (θ0) = θ1. Therefore θ0 > θs, which is a contradiction of our initial premise.
By the same reasoning, θ2, θ3... < θs. Since I (θ, θ) > θ for θ < θs, it follows that {θτ}
∞
τ=1 is an increasing
sequence. Following the proof of Proposition 8, we can show that the sequence converges to y = sup {θτ}
and that y corresponds to a steady-state. As all elements of the sequence are smaller than θs, it follows that
the steady-state must be θs.
(ii) Suppose I (θ0, θ0) < θ0, As I (0, 0) ≥ 1 and I (., .) is a continuous function, it follows that there is at







= θ′s. Following the reasoning in part (i) above, we can show that sequence{θτ}
∞
τ=1 is a
decreasing sequence that converges to θ′s.
(iii) Suppose I (θ0, θ0) = θ0. Since θt+1 = I (θt, θt) for t = 1, 2, .., it follows that θ1 = I (θ0, θ0) = θ0, and
θ2 = I (θ1, θ1) = I (θ0, θ0) = θ0, etc. Therefore, each element of the sequence {θτ}
∞
τ=1 is equal to θ0.
Next, we introduce the concept of monotonic equilibria and characterise their properties. The results are
used in the proof of Proposition 3.
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Denition 5 Given an initial value θ0, the sequence {θτ}
∞
τ=1 constitutes a monotonic increasing equilibrium
if θt = I (θt−1, θt+1) and θt ≥ θt−1 for t = 1, 2, .... Given an initial value θ0, the sequence {θτ}
∞
τ=1 constitutes
a monotonic decreasing equilibrium if θt = I (θt−1, θt+1) and θt ≤ θt−1 for t = 1, 2, ....
Proposition 8 (i) Given an initial value θ0, there exists a monotonic increasing equilibrium if and only if
there is a steady-state θ ∈ (θ0, 1]. The equilibrium sequence {θt}
∞
t=1 converges to a steady-state θ ∈ (θ0, 1].
(ii) Given an initial value θ0, there exists a monotonic decreasing equilibrium if and only if there is a
steady-state θ ∈ [0, θ0). The equilibrium sequence {θt}
∞
t=1 converges to a steady-state θ ∈ [0, θ0).
Proof. of Proposition 8: (i) Consider a monotonic increasing sequence {θt}
∞
t=0 where θt ∈ [0, 1] for all t.
First, we show that this sequence has a point of convergence in the interval (θ0, 1]. Let y = limt→∞ {θt}. It
follows that y = sup (θt) = x.
Next, we show that y corresponds to a steady-state equilibrium, i.e. I (y, y) = y. We prove this by
contradiction. Suppose I (y, y) > y. Then, as I (.) is continuous in both arguments, we can nd ε su¢ciently
small such that
I (y − ε, y − ε) > y
Given the convergence property of {θt}
∞
t=0, there exists T su¢ciently large such that for t ≥ T , we have
θt > y − ε. Therefore,
I (θT , θT+2) > y
=⇒ θT+1 > y
This contradicts the earlier statement that y is the supremum of the sequence.
Now suppose that I (y, y) < y and let z = y − I (y, y) > 0. Consider some δ > 0. By Lemma 1 and
continuity of I (.), we have, for each θ1, θ2 ∈ (y − δ, y)
I (θ1, θ2) ≤ y − z
Given the convergence property of {θt}
∞
t=0, there exists T su¢ciently large such that for t ≥ T , we have
θt ∈ (y − δ, y). Therefore for each r ≥ T + 1, we have




t=T+1 ≤ y − z
Given that the sequence {θt}
∞
t=0 is monotonic, we have
sup {θt}
∞
t=0 ≤ y − z < y
which contradicts the earlier statement that y is the supremum of the sequence. Therefore, it must be that
y corresponds to a steady-state equilibrium.
(ii) The proof for a monotonic decreasing sequence proceeds in the same manner as above, such that
we let x = inf {θt} and show that the sequence converges to x. Using the reasoning by contradiction used
above, we then show that x is a steady-state value, i.e. I (x, x) = x.
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Proof. of Proposition 3: First, we show that limα→∞ θ
α






an increasing sequence or a decreasing sequence. Without loss of generality, let us assume that it is an
increasing sequence.









I (θ0, θ0) = θ
0
1.
















τ for all τ ∈ {3, 4, ..}.
















τ for all α ∈ {3, 4, ..}
and each τ .
Therefore, {θατ }
∞
α=1 is an increasing sequence for each τ . Moreover, by construction, each θ
α
τ ∈ [0, 1]; i.e.
the sequence is bounded. Let xτ = sup {θ
α
τ }. By denition, for each ε > 0, ∃α ∈ N such that
θατ − x < ε




α=1 is a monotonic sequence, it
follows that |xτ − θ
α
τ | < ε for α ≥ α. Therefore, for r, s ≥ α, we obtain
|θrτ − θ
s
τ | ≤ |xτ − θ
r






α=1 constitutes a Cauchy sequence. Every Cauchy sequence of real numbers has a limit (see,
for example, Lang, p.143). Therefore, {θατ }
∞






decreasing sequence, then so is {θατ }
∞
α=1 and that it has a limit.
Let θ∞τ = limα→∞ {θ
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The last equality follows from the continuity of the function I (., .). Then, using Proposition 1, the initial










is an increasing sequence, by Proposition 2 θ01 = I (θ0, θ0) > θ0. Then, as the function I (., .)


























is also an increasing sequence. By iteration, we can show
that {θατ }
∞




τ=1 is an increasing sequence.




τ=1, constitutes a monotonic increasing equilibrium. Then,






is a decreasing sequence, we can show that {θ∞τ }
∞
τ=1 is a decreasing sequence, and




τ=1, constitutes a monotonic decreasing equilibrium which converges to
a steady-state in the interval [0, θ0).







are marriage market equilibrium paths
with iterated expectations. If θ0 < θ˜0, then θt < θ˜t for t > 0.








t for α = 1, 2, ...,
and t > 0. Therefore, θt = limα−→∞ θ
α
t ≤ limα−→∞ θ˜
α
t = θ˜t for each t > 0. Therefore




= θ˜1 (since θ0 < θ˜0 and θ2 ≤ θ˜2)
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= θ˜2 (since θ1 < θ˜1 and θ3 ≤ θ˜3)
Reasoning in the same manner, we obtain θt < θ˜t for t = 3, 4, ...
Proof. of Proposition 4: Consider a sequence {θt}
∞
t=0 generated by a marriage market equilibrium. In some
period t ≥ 1, if θt−1 > 0, then λ1 (t− 1) > 0. Then, using (3)-(5), we have εˆf2 (t) > εˆf1 (t). If θt+1 < 1, then
λ2 (t+ 1) > 0 and using (7), vf1 (t) > vf2 (t). It follows from (9), (8) and Assumption ?? that τ1 (t) < τ2 (t).
Conversely, if θt−1 = 0 and θt+1 = 1, then λ1 (t) = 0 and λ2 (t+ 1) = 0. Then, εˆf2 (t) = εˆf1 (t) and
vf1 (t) = vf2 (t). Therefore, we have τ1 (t) = τ2 (t).
Proof. of Proposition 5: It follows from equation (12) that
εf2 (θt−1, xt−1;π1) < εf2 (θt−1, xt−1;π2) (16)
That is, an older woman on the marriage market will have better reputation when the signal provided by


















; i.e. younger women on the marriage market will have better
outside options and make smaller net marriage transfers for smaller π.27 Therefore, Uˆ1 (θ, θt+1, xt;π1) <
Uˆ1 (θ, θt+1, xt;π2) for each θ ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand, it follows from (16) that Uˆ2 (θ, θt−1, xt−1;π1) >
Uˆ2 (θ, θt−1, xt−1;π2) for each θ ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, using (17) and (18), we have
x (θ, θt+1;π1) < x (θ, θt+1;π2) for each θ ∈ [0, 1]
Therefore, if θt, θt+1, xt−1 and xt are such that Uˆ1 (θt, θt+1, xt;π2) = Uˆ2 (θt, θt−1, xt−1;π2) and xt = x (θt, θt+1;π2),
then
Uˆ1 (θt, θt+1, xt;π1) < Uˆ2 (θt, θt−1, xt−1;π1)
xt > x (θt, θt+1;π1)
=⇒ Iˆ (θt−1, xt−1, θt+1;π1) < Iˆ (θt−1, xt−1, θt+1;π2)
and x (θt, θt+1;π1) < x (θt, θt+1;π2)
Suppose that (θss, xss) constitutes a steady-state equilibrium under π2. Therefore,
θss = Iˆ (θss, xˆ (θss, θss;π2) , θss;π2)
=⇒ θss > Iˆ (θss, xˆ (θss, θss;π1) , θss;π1)
By construction, Iˆ (0, xˆ (0, 0;π1) , 0;π1) ≥ 0. Therefore, using the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a
θπ1 ∈ [0, θss) such that θπ1 = Iˆ (θπ1, xˆ (θπ1, θπ1;π1) , θπ1;π1). Let xπ1 = xˆ (θπ1, θπ1;π1).
28 Then, (θπ1, xπ1)
consistutes steady-state under π1 and θπ1 < θss.
27Recall that vf1 and τ1 depend on the utility from singlehood uf1 which, given the assumption of heterogeneity in Section
4, can vary across women. We adjust the notation accordingly.
28To see this, let
H (θ;π1) = I^ (θ, x^ (θ, θ;π1) , θ;π1)− θ
At θ = θss, we have H (θ;π1) < 0 and at θ = 0, we have H (θ;π1) ≥ 0. It can be shown that H (θ;π1) is continuous in θ.





























By construction, Iˆ (1, xˆ (1, 1;π2) , 1;π2) ≤ 1. Therefore, using the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists
a θπ2 ∈ (θss, 1] such that θπ2 = Iˆ (θπ2, xˆ (θπ2, θπ2;π2) , θπ2;π2). Let xπ2 = xˆ (θπ2, θπ2;π2). Then, (θπ2, xπ2)
constitutes a steady-state under π2 and θπ2 > θ
′
ss.
Proof. of Lemma 3: First we consider, for young women of good character, the decision whether to accept
or refuse a marriage o¤er. Let x be the value of the utility from singlehood at which such a women is
indi¤erent between accepting and refusing a marriage o¤er. Then x must satisfy the following equation:
(1 + βζ)uf (τ1, εm) = x+ βζ

(1− λ2)uf2 + λ2uf (τ2, εm)

(18)
If τ1 solves um (τ1, εˆf1) = um then, at uf1 = x, both the bride and the groom will be left with zero surplus
from the marriage. For uf1 > x, there is no marriage contract that would satisfy both parties while, if
uf1 < x, then there is always some marriage contract that will satisfy both parties. Therefore, a marriage
contract will be negotiated if and only if uf1 ≥ x.
In equilibrium, young women of bad character will imitate the behaviour of those of good character in
deciding whether to accept or refuse a marriage o¤er. In particular, accepting a marriage o¤er at some
uf1 > x would imply that the bride has bad character (because, by construction, someone of good character
with the same outside option would not accept a marriage o¤er in equilibrium); while a young woman would
not nd it in her interest to refuse the equilibrium marriage o¤er at uf1 < x. Therefore, the same threshold
x applies to young women of bad character.
For the purpose of Proposition 7, we provide a formal denition of a Naive Expectations Equilibrium in
the case where refusals occur. Given (θ0, x0), a Naive Expectations Equilibrium is constructed as follows. We














for each t ≥ 1. Then the algorithm for iterating expectations,














for α = 1, 2, ... Following






τ=1 exists and that it constitutes
a marriage market equilibrium (with iterated expectations).
Proof. of Proposition 7: Suppose that the shock in question improves the common element of the outside
option from x to x˜ for young women who enter the marriage market in period τ (leaving unchanged the









the Naive Expectations Equilibrium in the







the Naive Expectations Equilibrium when there is no such
shock. By construction,





τ = Iˆ (θτ−1, xτ−1, θτ−1) = θ
0
τ

















t for α = 1, 2, ...
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Let θ˜t = limα−→∞ θ˜
α
t , x˜t = limα−→∞ x˜
α




















α=0, we must have














x, θ˜τ , θ˜τ+2

≤ xˆ (x, θτ , θτ+2) = xτ
θ˜τ+1 = Iˆ

θ˜τ , x˜τ , θ˜τ+2












< Iˆ (θτ+1, xτ+1, θτ+3) = θτ+2
Therefore, in subsequent periods, x˜t and θ˜t are strictly below xt and θt respectively. Following the same
type of reasoning, we can show that θ˜t ≥ θt and x˜t ≥ xt for t ≥ τ and strict inequality from period τ + 2
onwards if the transitory shock worsens the outside option of young women.
9 Appendix B
The following table lists the system of equations used to compute the steady-state values and parameters γ,
σ and π. For ease of notation, we let λ′2 = (1− εˆf1)λ2 + εˆf1λ2 (1− π).
Table B1: System of Equations for Computing the Steady-State and Parameter Values
# Equation Type




























2 {−τ2 + σ (1− εm)} = 0 equilibrium
6 τ1 −
1
2 [σ (1− εm)− σ (1− εˆf1)−Evf1 + vm2] = 0 equilibrium
7 τ2 −
1
2 [σ (1− εm)− σ (1− εˆf2)− vf2 + vm2] = 0 equilibrium
8 U1 (θ, nf1, nm, τ1, εf1)− U2 (θ, nf2, nm, τ2, εf2) = 0 equilibrium
9 τ1/τ2 − 2.09 = 0 moment-matching
10 λ1 (1− πεf )− 0.7205 = 0 moment-matching
11 (1− λ1 + λ1πεf ) (1− λ2 + λ2πεf2)− 0.05 = 0 moment-matching
Furthermore, λ′2 = λ2 (1− πεf2), εˆf1 is given by (4), and εˆf2 by (5).
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